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Physical Address
Indirizzo: Via Mario Greco 60, Buttigliera Alta, 10090, Torino, Italy
More than eight hundred associations at the national level have benefited from external funding for a total amount exceeding 17 billion dinars, or nearly $ 119 million. This is revealed by the national report on the inventory of civil society and its possible vulnerabilities in the face of exploitation risks by terrorism financing networks, published yesterday by the National Observatory of Civil Society.
The report made under the direction of the Ministry of the Interior, in collaboration with the World Bank and all the institutions concerned, specifies that 845 associations receive external funding. France is by far the main provider, representing 62.45 % of the contributions. Then come the United Arab Emirates with 4.49 %, Canada with 3.97 %, Spain with 3.8 %, Turkey with 3.46 %, then Switzerland and Germany with 1.9 %each.
The absolute value, a considerable manna, illustrates the vitality and credibility of numerous local initiatives, but also imposes greater vigilance on the attempts to diversion to finance terrorist actions. Especially since, even if this study concluded that a generally low risk, the fact remains that charitable, religious associations and certain foundations require greater vigilance
This financial reality is part of a particularly dense associative landscape. The country has 41,807 associations entering the field defined by the financial action group (GAFI). Among them, religious associations are the most numerous with 20,034 structures, often linked to the management of mosques and the collection of donations. Next come 9,619 charitable associations, active in helping the poorest, 8,199 cultural associations, 3,615 environmental, 335 foundations and six offices ofNGO A non -governmental organization (NGO) is a non -profit association, of public interest, which is neither the state of the state, nor of international institutions international authorized to practice in Algeria.
Besides this nucleus, more than 50,000 so -called “GAFI outside” associations pursue sports, scientific, professional, youth, or even neighborhood committees. These structures, which do not collect funds to redistribute, are considered much less exposed to attempts at financial abuse.
Limited but revealing alerts
Despite the extent of associations and their funding, the point of excesses remain rare. Between 2020 and 2024, the financial intelligence process has identified four cases of suspicious operation. Three concerned charitable associations and only one a religious association. None led to a conviction. These relatively low figures translate a controlled situation, but confirm that the risk exists and that it primarily affects segments manipulating humanitarian or religious funds.
The evaluation clearly distinguishes risk levels. The threat is considered low, with an indicative score of 0.20 for most categories. But vulnerability appears more marked in charitable associations, which reach 0.60 and in certain foundations, evaluated at 0.53. The intrinsic risk remains generally moderate, but it reaches 0.70 for charitable associations and 0.78 for religious associations. The foundations are evaluated at 0.20 and international NGOs at 0.17, which reflects a lower exhibition. The rapporteurs want to specify that they do not minimize the risks. The threat is deemed generally low, but it focuses on certain categories.
In total, 3,115 associations were classified as potentially exposed. Among them, 928 are charities, 1,852 nuns and 335 are foundations. This figure, which represents less than 10 % of the total, shows that the danger is circumscribed but that it must be treated with seriousness and justifies reinforced monitoring.
5 -axis prevention strategy
Based on these observations, the authorities have drawn a prevention strategy which must go between 2025 and 2026. It plans to intensify the awareness of the most exposed associations, and this through information campaigns and practical training. A centralized national database will be set up to better follow financial flows and cross information. Targeted inspections will be launched in December 2025, especially in border wilayas, areas deemed more vulnerable. In 2026, a new legal framework will strengthen transparency obligations, like the declaration of effective beneficiaries, regular financial reports and sanctions in the event of shortcomings. Finally, international cooperation will be consolidated in order to facilitate the exchange of information and monitoring transnational transfers.
It should be noted that this study recalls that the fight against terrorism has been profoundly transformed over the past twenty years. Formerly focused on military action and intelligence operations, it now extends to the financial field. The attacks of September 11, 2001 marked a historical tilting, that where the international community has realized that money is the oxygen of terrorist networks. Without financial flows, no weapons, no logistics, no propaganda. It is in this logic that the role of the financial action group was reinforced, created in 1989 by the G7 countries. Initially responsible for fighting money laundering, the GAFI saw its mandate extended to the fight against the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Its recommendations, which have become reference standards, require states of transparency and vigilance obligations. Among them, the number eight recommendation aroused special attention; It targets non -profit associations, deemed vulnerable because of their role as fundraising and their ability to act in sensitive areas, sometimes even outside the direct control of the national authorities.
Algeria’s early commitment
Algeria, which lived in its flesh the ravages of terrorism during the black decade of the 1990s, did not wait for the international community to tackle the financing of violence. It very early ratified the multilateral and regional conventions relating to money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and undertook to strengthen its national legislation. Since 2004, the country has been a member of MENAFATF, the regional GAFI for the Middle East and North Africa. In 2022, a mutual assessment report had recognized the advances of Algeria, while encouraging it to intensify the monitoring of the associative sector. In a context where associations play an increasingly central role in social life, it became urgent to reconcile associative and imperative security. This was what led, in January 2025, to the launch of a national risk assessment. This initiative was entrusted to the Ministry of the Interior and local communities, but it mobilized the entire state apparatus. Took part in the work of national defense, justice, religious affairs, the bank of Algeria, customs, national security and the national gendarmerie, as well as the financial intelligence process, key body of monitoring of financial flows. To give the evaluation a concrete anchoring, representative associations were requested, among which Kafil El-Yatim, known for his action with orphans, Algerian youth, Islamic scouting and Hope Dz. Their participation made it possible to integrate the voice of civil society and to better understand the reality on the ground. The methodology followed was inspired by international standards established by the GAFI and the technical expertise of the World Bank. It has combined quantitative and qualitative data, the analysis of legal statutes, examining financial reports and the evaluation of cross -border flows. The report editors maintain that this work, carried out for several months, made it possible to deliver a faithful and documented image of the Algerian associative landscape.
Finally, this report, intended to counter the risks of terrorist financing under cover of civil society structures, reveals a double issue. On the one hand, Algeria has an abundant associative movement, rich in tens of thousands of initiatives which contribute to national solidarity, culture and local development. On the other hand, certain segments, notably charitable and religious, have a fragility which imposes particular attention and which it would be imprudent to ignore. The strategy adopted by the authorities is based on a delicate balance, that of preserving the freedom and vitality of community life, while neutralizing any attempted diversion. In a region where security threats persist, transparency and traceability appear as essential conditions to protect the associative sector, guarantors of a strong, credible and protected civil society against any malicious exploitation and attempted instrumentalization.