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Physical Address
Indirizzo: Via Mario Greco 60, Buttigliera Alta, 10090, Torino, Italy

With activity somewhat less than spellbinding on the ground in Ukraine, apparently, a current pass time amongst some DKos diarists is to write about what “stuff” Ukraine needs to win the war. These specify sending a bunch of “stuff” that, in many cases, is science fiction; is (maybe) in development and might be ready in a few years; does not exist at all; exists only in relatively useless small quantities; would require extensive modification before delivery, …
Okay, I’ll admit that this is not a current activity for many writers here, but we’ve all seen it of late on the #Ukraine tag. I figured that, since I (and others) have been accused of not wanting Ukraine to win simply because I do not adhere to these fantastical, almost random views of how a war should be supplied, I would put forth my own thoughts on the “stuff” that Ukraine needs.
I believe that no amount of super “stuff” will “win” this war within the foreseeable future barring a major event that is likely outside of Ukraine’s borders and control with “win” defined as militarily pushing Russia back to its pre-1994 borders.
Taking the existing situation and superimposing a ton of “stuff” will not lead to a huge change in result. Would it stop and, in some cases, reverse Russian advances? Yes, I believe it would. However, with Avdiivka now gone, there’s not much in the way of Russian advances going on anyway when compared to the vast amount of acreage that remains free. For detail on that, see here. Would it increase Russia’s losses in material and manpower while reducing the same for Ukraine? Yes, I believe it would. These alone are excellent reasons to send “stuff,” so, we really need to start sending it, again. Quick-like.
However, would it cause Russia to turn tail and run for the border or lead to deep penetrations of Russian defensive positions or cause the crippling of Russia’s industrial base? NO. I do not believe it would. You may have a different opinion. More power to you. This is not intended to debate the point. It is to talk about what we should send.
So, with that out of the way, what “stuff” should we send? Should we be sending blimps and not-yet-highly-modified F-16s and purely theoretical naval drones and a bunch of “stuff” that is at the fever-dream stage of development? No. We can’t sent it if it doesn’t exist or will delay things a great deal. And we should not be distracted by this BS dream “stuff”. Let’s keep it real.
No amount of Wiki searching will win the war for Ukraine.
We should concentrate our efforts on and contact our lawmakers about…
While people win wars, they do need “stuff” and what the US specifically (other countries need to send “stuff”, too) should send, in my opinion, is the boring things that actually help people win wars. It falls roughly into these categories:
Ukraine has suffered losses through combat and breakage/wear. First, replace combat and non-combat vehicles and equipment to bring Ukraine back up to the levels supplied previously if requested by Ukraine. Quantities are approximate and are not the amount to send. They are the amount to build back to for this stage of supply. Also, they should be brought to full strength not counting those being repaired in Poland (e.g. Bradleys), the US (e.g. HIMARs), and other locations. Those in repair are now extra and can go back to Ukraine when fixed to replace future losses which will occur:
This alone will amount to several hundred vehicles and major pieces of equipment plus many semi-trailers of smaller “stuff.” You may have noticed that Abrams tanks aren’t listed. I’ll leave you to ponder that. It’s at the end.
Inventories of all types of ammunition have been, at best, reduced and, at worst, almost run dry. Bring it back up to required levels and beyond:
Time to restock.
Tools, field equipment, parts, batteries, spares, tires, track shoes, spare barrels, repair and diagnostic equipment, maintenance manuals TRANSLATED INTO UKRAINIAN, body armor, helmets, winter gear, boots, uniforms, gas masks, barbed wire and concertina, chain saws, picks and shovels, medical supplies, field rations, medicines, water purification equipment, EOD gear, generators, night vision devices/sights, laser range finders, surveillance systems, and other optics, tactical communications equipment, personal hygiene supplies, mobile kitchens and showers, etc. ALL THE BORING “STUFF” THAT MAKES AN ARMY ACTUALLY WORK!!!
Special Weaknesses 1 – Engineering (i.e. Minefields): What stopped Ukraine last campaign season? MINEFIELDS. No point in sending lots of offensive capability if it will sit on the wrong side of the minefields. If there is any area/subject that needs “fairyland” thinking of the sort we have seen here recently, it is this area right here right now. And I have no magic to add, unfortunately, other than send more of what we have now. Just greater capacity using the current technology. Blimps won’t help. Super-modified F-16s delivered in 2-3 years won’t help. SEND EVERY MINE CLEARING CAPABILITY WE HAVE!
Since it fits into the Engineering category, other engineering equipment is listed here as well:
Special Weaknesses 2 – Air Defense:
More 3D printers; satellite imagery, data, and targeting information; satellite communications antennae; SATCOM terminals and services; technical assistance at every level of every specialty.
F-16: Advance the goal of F-16 use by the Ukrainian air force. I worded that carefully since I do not expect to see F-16s in the skies over Ukraine in any useful quantity this year. So, build for next year. I was not air force (thank dog), so I’m sure there are many steps that could be taken to advance the integration of F-16s into the Ukrainian military. These are just some examples:
This much replacement and new equipment will require an additional 10K troops and probably more to rebuild the units that are now undermanned and to form probably one new brigade (if the extra 100 Bradleys come through) and to support the fighting units. Ukraine must plan where this additional manpower will come from. Reports are that they are stretched thin as it is.
In other words, it’s probably time, in my opinion, for Ukraine to expand conscription. Actually, it’s about nine months past time since training takes many months. This means any likely large push is now into next year.
And Europe needs to supply more Leopard 2s to accompany the extra Bradleys and/or replace losses. Probably about 100 (off the top of my head).
Both of these last two items are problems.
This list above is many boatloads and several billions of dollars, so no one is dragging any feet. Throw in the millions of man-hours of training that must be done including training up and developing commanders and staff and NCOs and, most important, entire units, and we’re at another boatload of supplies used during that training time. Training ain’t free. That means that there will need to be difficult decisions made at each step based on available money and estimated future need. Unlike some folks, we here know that the money/resources are not infinite and that we do not live in a constraint free environment. As I do not have access to costs and quantities of each item etc., I cannot specify more exactly what should be sent. But it’s a balance. And we here are BS guessing and arguing over BS details about which we know very little.
So, 2025 is the likely planning horizon.
Hope to see everyone still here and interested/involved then. In the meantime, write your congress-critters and talk about…
I bet the fastest way to get your missive thrown in the Congressional trash bin by some aide is to put in the word “dirigible.”