Putin visits Azerbaijan to shift focus from Ukrainian offensive in Kursk Oblast – ISW

Putin with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku. Photo: TASS, a Kremlin-aligned Russian news outlet 

Experts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) have noted that Russian leader Vladimir Putin went to Baku, supposedly to showcase diplomatic activity, and tried to divert attention from the “uncomfortable situation” in Russia’s Kursk Oblast caused by the Ukrainian offensive.

Source: ISW

Details: On 18 August, Russian leader Vladimir Putin travelled to Azerbaijan, seemingly to divert attention from the recent Ukrainian offensive in Kursk Oblast and to reinforce his image as a capable diplomat.

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Putin, accompanied by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and a Russian delegation, arrived in Baku for a two-day visit aimed at discussions with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. The talks reportedly focused on strengthening Russian-Azerbaijani relations, particularly in the energy sector, promoting Russian-language programmes in Azerbaijan, and exploring Russia’s role in brokering peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Quote: “The timing of this visit is noteworthy given the ongoing situation in Kursk Oblast and the Kremlin’s continued efforts to downplay the Ukrainian incursion’s magnitude and impact. 

Russian state media focused on Putin’s trip to Azerbaijan, amplifying minute details, likely in part to divert attention from the uncomfortable situation in Russia by saturating the information space with a showcase of the Kremlin’s global diplomatic engagement and alleged successes.”

More details: On 19 August, Ukrainian forces made small but steady gains in Kursk Oblast. The Kremlin’s response to these advances underscores its growing preoccupation with regime stability, a focus that has intensified over the past year.

Vazhnye Istorii (Important Stories), a Russian media outlet, reported on the same day that Putin’s approach to the “Kursk situation” has exposed significant shifts within the Kremlin’s power hierarchy, many of which have been unfolding in recent months.

In a notable move, Putin appointed his aide, Alexei Dyumin, to lead the “counterterrorism” efforts against Ukrainian activities in Kursk Oblast. Vazhnye Istorii noted that this decision suggested that Putin was increasingly wary of the Russian General Staff and the Ministry of Defence – organisations usually responsible for such military operations – and was instead placing his trust in close associates.

An insider reportedly revealed to Vazhnye Istorii that Dyumin’s appointment had sparked tensions with members of the Russian Presidential Administration, further indicating that Putin continues to favour personal loyalty over professional expertise in key roles.

Quote: “Vazhnye Istorii’s reporting strongly suggests that the Kremlin has increasingly oriented its main priorities towards regime stability. 

ISW has reported at length on Putin’s efforts to maintain a core cadre of loyal siloviki (Russian strongmen with political influence) within the Russian power vertical, particularly since the risks to Putin’s regime first introduced by the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion in June 2023.

The Kremlin’s general shift towards siloviki such as Dyumin, whom Putin personally trusts, and security officials with strong and well-documented reputations in counterterrorism and counterintelligence, suggests that the Kremlin is increasingly looking towards such individuals as regime safeguards. Ukraine’s operation into Kursk Oblast has particularly exposed this dynamic, and the Kremlin’s continued response to the incursion further emphasises the ever-increasing reliance on security officials and structures over more politically or economically focused internal structures.”

To quote the ISW’s Key Takeaways on 19 August:

• Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance in Kursk Oblast on 19 August amid continued fighting throughout the Ukrainian salient in the area.
• Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov aggravated a situation that the Kremlin has historically treated with extreme caution by calling for conscripts to participate in combat operations in Kursk Oblast and dismissing concerns from relatives of conscripts.
• Russian leader Vladimir Putin visited Azerbaijan on 18 August, likely in an effort to shift focus away from the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and present himself as a continually effective diplomat.
• The Kremlin’s response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast has emphasised how the Kremlin’s internal priorities have increasingly oriented towards regime stability, especially over the past year.
• Russian ruler Vladimir Putin signed a decree on 19 August further codifying a vague Russian state ideology into Russian law without concretely modifying the Russian Constitution. Putin’s effort to codify a specific ideology may be intended to counter the Russian ultranationalist community’s own efforts to establish an accepted national ideology.
• Russian officials continued attempts to falsely frame Ukraine as responsible for the lack of negotiations to end the war.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupiansk, Svatove, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
• Local Sakhalin Oblast media outlet Sakhalin Media reported on 19 August that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service in Sakhalin Oblast and other federal subjects within the Russian Far East, Northwestern, and North Caucasian federal okrugs has resumed conscription for the first time in an unspecified “long” length of time.

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