Just like Turkey, Qatar and the US were supporting ‘opposition’ factions in Syria (like SNA, HTS and SDF), Iran will probably start funding / arming factions loyal to it inside Syria, after the new government is formed.

I give it a maximum of two years before we see the first tangible results of Iranian-backed ‘opposition’ groups inside the new ‘Free Syria’. Iran will likely try to maintain at least some sort of influence in Syria this way.

Assad was never really in the ‘Resistance Axis’ camp, at least not in terms of ideology; he was loosely a part of it, mostly due to geopolitical considerations and strategic necessities. Fundamentally, he was not like Hezbollah, the PMF, or Ansarullah in Yemen, who are all revolutionary Shiites in ideology.

So, it is very possible that we will see an ‘Islamic Resistance in Syria’ within the next few months or years. They might not actually control territory inside Syria, but they could exercise soft power and carry out qualitative resistance operations against Israel or US bases, or even against the government itself.

Also, I would not discount the presence of some former pro-SAA / pro-Assad loyalists inside Syria. People like General Suhail Hassan, commander of the 25th SMF Division (Tiger Forces) enjoy considerable popularity inside Syria, especially among Alawites and upper-class Sunnis in the major cities.

In any future civil war, I expect some of the ‘old guard’ of the SAA High Command to gather portions of their old units and attempt at least a limited power grab, perhaps in Latakia and Tartous, or even in Damascus. These are areas that were much more pro-Assad compared to other areas in Syria.

I’m not saying they’ll actually be successful in overthrowing the future Rebel-led ‘Free Syrian’ Government, but Arab states like Syria are often quite susceptible to military rule. These states simply are not used to democracy, and military ‘strongmen’ from the former regime often end up in power.

Look at Egypt, where the government was overthrown by Islamists in 2011, and the military regained power only two years later in 2013. Or for example, look at the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Haftar, a former officer in the military of Muammar Gadaffi.

Even if this doesn’t end up happening, you can probably be sure that former SAA elements will play a significant role in Syrian politics for years to come. Most of them will publicly disavow Bashar al-Assad though, as they don’t want to be identified with him any more.

Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s brother, is however sometimes said to have a promising political future. He’s much more pro-Iran than his brother Bashar, and many consider him ‘Iran’s man’ in Syria. Whether he’s even still in Syria, and whether he will ever get involved in his country’s politics ever again, remains to be seen.

Lastly, HTS (or whatever the ‘Free Syrian’ Government will be) needs to prove itself. It has to show the population that it can not only control the institutions and the day-to-day life in Syria, but that it can defend the country from external threats. If HTS fails to show that it can rule and effectively govern a unified and strong Syria, especially in the face of Israeli aggression, then he will lose legitimacy quite soon, which could ultimately have consequences and bring considerable challenges to its rule.

In any case, the Islamic Republic of Iran will do whatever it can to maintain at least some sort of influence in Syria. Whether that’s supporting pro-Iranian factions / Shiite militias, or supporting former SAA loyalists, Iran’s arm is long, and it won’t disappear.

@Middle_East_Spectator