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The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is a militia umbrella organization established in June 2014 following the Daesh terrorist organization’s capture of Mosul, at the call/fatwa of Iraq’s highest Shiite religious authority, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Although the PMF appears to have emerged at al-Sistani’s call, the origins of its core groups date back to the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. In other words, al-Sistani’s call brought together pro-Iranian Shiite organizations that had previously existed under a common umbrella. The profile of PMF’s leadership cadre demonstrates the organization’s organic ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and particularly the Quds Force.
As of 2025, the PMF’s position is as follows: On the one hand, it is part of the state apparatus and influences government policies. On the other hand, it presents a contradictory structure that operates partially independently of state authority. There is also ideological division among the Shiite groups within the PMF: Nearly 60% of them are pro-Iranian factions directly loyal to Iran’s religious leader, Ali Khamenei. About a quarter are Iraqi nationalist groups aligned with al-Sistani, while the rest are militias loyal to other movements, such as the Sadrist Movement.
The resurgence of the PMF in Iraq brings with it political difficulties and public backlash. Large segments see its perceived dependence on Iran of the population as undermining Iraq’s sovereignty. Some of the organization’s sub-groups follow the Qom (Iran) school of Shiism rather than the Najaf (Iraq) school. This situation is also drawing criticism because it fuels sectarianism in Iraq.
Iran’s use of the PMF as an instrument of influence carries risks that could pit Iraq against neighboring Arab countries and even Türkiye. If the uncontrolled actions of certain radical factions within the PMF continue, Iraq’s fragile sectarian balance could be shaken. Furthermore, Iraq could become an arena for conflict in the power struggle between Iran and the West (particularly the U.S.). Additionally, since international coalition forces and the NATO mission are still present in Iraq for training purposes, there is talk that hardline elements within the PMF may target these forces in the future.
Türkiye’s relations with PMF
Türkiye has always emphasized its support for Iraq’s territorial integrity and political unity, adopting a strategy of establishing contact with all actors playing a significant role in Iraq’s internal balance. This approach became particularly evident after Hakan Fidan became Türkiye’s minister of foreign affairs. Fidan, who is well-acquainted with Iraqi actors in his capacity as the former head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), visited Baghdad immediately upon taking office and engaged in intensive contacts.
The key factors shaping Ankara’s security and diplomatic position regarding the PMF are the fight against PKK terrorism and instability in northern Iraq. Türkiye has long sought to deepen security cooperation with the Iraqi central government due to the presence of the PKK terrorist organization in northern Iraq. In this context, the Sinjar region is a particularly critical agenda item. Sinjar is a region where the PKK established influence after the 2014 Daesh massacres. It is also home to the PMF militias and the Yazidi population.
Fidan stated in an interview with CNN Türk in March 2024 that they had held intensive consultations with the PMF leaders regarding Sinjar. According to Fidan, Ankara worked with the central Iraqi government to bring specific critical points in Sinjar under control and close gaps along the border. It even provided financial support for border security measures. During this process, regular contact was maintained with Falih Feyyad, chair of the PMF Commission, and Feyyad visited Ankara to meet with Fidan. Fidan summarized Türkiye’s position by stating, “The PMF is now a reality in Iraq; it is a legal force included in the system, receiving its budget from the state.” In other words, Ankara believes that it is now futile to exclude the PMF; it is more rational to seek solutions by including it at the table. This way, if a problem arises in the future due to the PMF, its leaders will no longer have a chance to say, “We were not included in the process.”
With this strategy, Türkiye is encouraging the PMF on the one hand, while sending an indirect message to Iran on the other. Ankara emphasizes that it will recognize the PMF as legitimate if it takes the initiative on issues it considers common enemies, such as the PKK, but will perceive the PMF as a threat if it does not. Indeed, Turkish decision-makers assess that radical elements within the PMF could pose a long-term threat not only to Iraq but also to Türkiye and NATO. Structures within the PMF, such as Kataib Hezbollah, have the potential to target Türkiye’s bases and personnel in the region as much as the U.S. military presence in Iraq. Therefore, Ankara has adopted a policy of controlled engagement with the PMF. A concrete reflection of this balance is the meeting that took place in Ankara on Aug. 30, 2025, between Fidan and Feyyad. The Turkish Foreign Ministry announced the meeting to the public, but did not provide any additional details. This meeting likely had several goals based on its context.
Fidan’s meeting with PMF
The primary focus of the Fidan-Feyyad meeting was likely to discuss actions to take against the PKK’s presence in Iraq. Tightening control in areas such as Sinjar and Mahmur with the support of the PMF and restricting the PKK’s area of operation may have been discussed. Türkiye’s military presence in northern Iraq, particularly at the Bashiqa camp, and its training and advisory activities may also have been on the table. Some groups within the PMF have reacted negatively to the Turkish presence in the past and even made threatening statements. Fidan may have warned Feyyad, emphasizing that the Turkish presence aims to contribute to Iraq’s stability. Although it appears to be a security-focused visit, Türkiye is also bringing up the dimensions of economic and humanitarian cooperation in its talks with its counterparts. The security of Turkish investments and energy projects in the southern provinces, such as Basra and Karbala, where the PMF is active, as well as the security of visiting Turkish citizens (such as those visiting shrines), may also have been noted.
The timing of the Fidan-Feyyad meeting is also significant. The visit took place at a time when regional tensions between Iran and the U.S. were rising, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was increasing tensions in the region. As a NATO member, Türkiye wants to prevent Iraq from shifting entirely toward the Iranian axis. From this perspective, we see that Ankara has adopted a “critical but diplomatic” tone in its policy toward the PMF.
Türkiye’s approach to the PMF can be summarized as follows: managing a multidimensional relationship in line with national security priorities, considering Iraq’s internal dynamics. On the one hand, Turkish decision-makers view the PMF as a critical link in Iran’s network of proxies in the region and consider it a potential threat to national interests. Indeed, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq pose a long-term risk to NATO and Turkish interests. On the other hand, it is also evident that it has become impossible to consider the PMF structure separately from the Iraqi state. Therefore, rather than excluding the PMF, Türkiye is striving to transform it into a controllable and responsible actor.
As a result, Türkiye is attempting to establish a balance based on “ensuring its own national security to the maximum extent possible without interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbors.” Ankara is acting by maintaining diplomatic channels, adopting win-win approaches and reminding others of its military deterrence when necessary. The policy pursued regarding the PMF is also part of this bigger picture. The goal is to prevent Iraq from becoming “a second Syria” or “Iran’s backyard” and to see Iraq as a sovereign and prosperous neighboring country that can determine its own future. Achieving this goal will make Türkiye’s southern borders safer and create a more peaceful Middle East. This matter holds significant importance for the security of Türkiye and is crucial for maintaining stability and peace throughout the region.
