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Jean-Charles Jauffret, historian, specialist in military issues of the Algerian War:
“None of the intelligence services (SR) expected a large-scale movement, but rather unrest from the end of summer 54. It is more difficult in peacetime to have intelligence taken into consideration than to acquire it. The Cassandras of intelligence have come up against an axiom since the very severe repression of May-June 1945 in Sétif and Constantinois: order reigns in Algeria and politicians do not want to hear anything.
Twice in May and September 1954, the North African Liaison Service (SNLA, headed by Colonel Schoen) tried to alert the Governor General, Roger Léonard, but his information was not taken into consideration. The other services, under the orders of prefect Jean Vaujour, head of General Security of Algiers, had chosen to penetrate the nationalist networks up to those of the bomb manufacturers in Algiers (…) A new development, the Second Bureau is considering the possibility of direct action by the CRUA. But the meeting at Clos Salembier, that of the ”Twenty-two” (Clos-Salembier) is ignored.
Claude Faure, former SDECE/DGSE officer, become historian of French intelligence. He is the author, with Fayard (2004), of “ At the services of the Republic, from the BCRA to the DGSE “. :
The French intelligence services did not see the insurrection of 1er November 1954. “They didn’t expect it. Before this date, French intelligence efforts, particularly on 2e office and the SDECE, are focused on Indochina. Algeria is covered by the police services – RG, DST, gendarmerie – and the North African Liaison Service (SNLA) of Colonel Schoen. In March 1954, the DST launched an operation called “Sirocco” intended to dismantle a network of activists.
The following month, reports from the RG and the DST landed with the governor general, Roger Léonard, and the head of general security in Algeria, Jean Vaujour. Content of the notes received: small stocks of weapons and workshops for manufacturing leaflets and bombs were discovered in several towns in the territory. The intelligence services have in their possession some information on what is happening, on what could be planned. But at no time do they think of the imminence of a general insurrection.
The insurrection triggered, “the president of the council, Pierre Mendès France, instructed the ministers of the interior and defense to mobilize all services. A priority is set: neutralize the leaders and put an end to the movement. General Cherrière, commander of the forces in Algeria, decides to set up operational intelligence centers throughout Algeria.
All intelligence policy will be made in the light of the Indochinese experience. From December, a structure of 11e choc, the operational arm of the SCEDE, was set up for special operational needs in Algeria. Things accelerated from 1955. An interministerial decree dated May 11 defined the French intelligence strategy and set its priorities. An “Algeria” committee is established alongside the director of SDECE. Algerian immigration is particularly monitored. In addition to the DST and the RG, we are mobilizing the SDECE for the first time in mainland France.
Set by political power, there are mainly two of them: the elimination of politico-military leaders and the dismantling of the FLN’s weapons networks. Boats were destroyed and lines dismantled, particularly in Germany.
On the first point, let us cite the operation which targeted the head of wilaya 1 using a booby trap or the aborted plan to liquidate Ben Bella in Cairo. The intelligence services also target the leaders of the Revolution including Boudiaf, Aït-Ahmed, Ben Bella and Khider who were – in the company of Mostéfa Lacheraf – on board the plane hijacked by the French army. ”Originally, information from the head of the SDECE station in Algiers, Lieutenant-Colonel Germain, according to which four of the historic leaders of the FLN, Ait-Ahmed, Ben Bella, Boudiaf and Khider were going to borrow a Royal Air Maroc plane serving Tunis via Algeria.
Max Lejeune, Secretary of State for the Armed Forces in Guy Mollet’s cabinet, says “ok” for the diversion. Until the end of the war, the SDECE will endeavor to track the leaders of the FLN in the Maghreb, Egypt, Eastern countries, Germany, Switzerland and Italy. To this end, it will mobilize its local branches and request an exchange of information with allied services.”