Ottomans as seen by the Arabs

The relationship between the Arabs and the Ottoman Empire spans more than five centuries, from the Ottomans’ entry into Syria (Bilad al-Sham) in 1516 to the present day. This relationship was never stable or unequivocal; it was complex, subject to multiple political and social considerations and varied according to time and region.

Long before the Ottomans entered the lands of the Arab Levant, for reasons connected to their struggle against the Safavids and their desire to protect the Hejaz from Portuguese incursions, the Arabs regarded the Ottomans as a preeminent Islamic power, worthy of respect and admiration. Nothing illustrates this better than the enthusiasm and rejoicing expressed by Arab peoples upon the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, an event long awaited by Muslims due to the prophetic promise attached to it.

The fall of the caliphate

However, after the fall of the caliphate and the emergence of Arab and Turkish nationalist movements, the Ottoman Empire became the target of a vast campaign of disparagement. This effort, fueled by authoritarian Arab regimes supported by nationalist and secular parties influenced by Orientalist thought, sought to undermine the Ottomans’ historical image from the very beginnings of their European expansion, particularly under the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent.

These campaigns reflect one of the two prevailing Arab perspectives on the Ottomans. The Arab sphere is generally characterized by two main approaches: an Eastern one, predominantly negative, and a Western one marked by a more positive outlook. The negative Eastern perspective itself branches into two tendencies: one that remains loyal to the image of the Ottoman Empire as a great and formidable Islamic power, an outlook embodied in the Islamic current, popular religious sentiment, and certain sympathetic academic historical studies; and another, led by Arab nationalists and secularists, who viewed Ottoman presence in the Levant as a form of occupation and held it responsible for the backwardness of Arab states. This latter perception, further reinforced by certain academic historical studies, was propagated and entrenched in public consciousness by anti-Ottoman nationalist parties.

Ottomans seen by Arabs

In his book “The Ottomans Seen by the Arabs: Mentalities and a Composite Image, from Jihad to Despotism,” Jordanian historian Muhannad al-Mubaidin offers a nuanced reading of the mental representation shaped around the Ottomans, at times celebrated as the embodiment of the Islamic caliphate, at times criticized as a symbol of prolonged despotism.

His analysis draws on literary and historical sources that helped forge this image, poetry, narratives and chronicles, from the Ottoman period to modern studies.

Al-Mubaidin begins his reading of Ottoman history from the 15th century, when the Portuguese threat in the Indian Ocean grew and endangered Arab cities, opening the way for Ottoman expansion eastward. The Ottomans’ entry into the region marked a turning point: their modern firearms triumphed over the traditional swords of the Mamluks, a decisive transformation that caught the attention of contemporary chroniclers.

This is evident in the treatise of Sheikh Ibn Alwan entitled “The Advice of Sheikh ʿAlwan to Sultan Selim ibn Uthman.” In his letter, Ibn Alwan reminded Sultan Selim of his responsibilities toward his subjects, while expressing a critical stance toward certain behaviors of the new rulers.

In Damascus, historian Ibn al-Himsi recounts the Battle of Marj Dabiq and seeks to grasp the ensuing political upheavals. He carefully notes the titles referring to Selim I as “King of the Romans” (malik al-Rum). This distinction demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of the Ottoman world before it arrived in the Levant. The eminent Turkish historian Ilber Ortaylı, moreover, reminds us that Mehmed the Conqueror favored this title “King of the Romans” after taking Constantinople, thereby continuing Byzantine grandeur.

At the beginning of the 17th century, Arab chroniclers mention relative stability in certain Arab cities, though their judgments differ. For Abd al-Malik ibn Husayn al-Isami, Ottoman rule prolonged the path of the pious ancestors. The history of the Arab provinces cannot be understood without considering the conflicts the Ottoman caliphate waged against foreign powers, France, Russia, Great Britain and the Safavids, all eager for regional domination.

Perspectives by region

The Ottomans did not enter Arab lands as conquerors, but as defenders of Islamic identity against invaders. This fact cannot be separated from the two major developments that subsequently shaped the Arab world: the opposition between Arabness and Ottomanism, and the transition from the Ottoman imperial era to the age of nationalisms. Thus, Ottoman presence in Syria remains the subject of debate, between the vision of “liberator” and that of “occupier.” In Lebanon, the interpretation differs; in Jordan and Palestine, it appears more measured.

In the Gulf, collective memory preserves a largely negative image of the Ottomans, reflected in literary and dramatic works dedicated to that period. The Saudi example illustrates this: from the founding of the first Saudi state in 1727, Ottoman distrust toward the new political project of the Arabian Peninsula fostered the crystallization of an unfavorable historical perception of the Empire in regional consciousness. Nevertheless, several contemporary Saudi historians have produced rigorous studies on this period. In Yemen, the Sublime Porte encountered fierce resistance due to the country’s tribal particularism.

In Egypt, in contrast, Ottoman rule has been the subject of extensive research that situates it within the natural continuity of Arab history, a result of the vacuum left by the Mamluk collapse. It is thus seen as a rather positive transitional phase.

In Iraq, interpretation was largely ideological: The Ottomans were perceived as the saviors of the country from Safavid occupation, and their image remains generally favorable, particularly due to Iraq’s cultural and social flourishing in the 16th century.

In Palestine, under feudal rule, historiography influenced by the 19th-century Russian school emphasized peasant revolts, disorder and social struggles.

The Algerian experience, however, stands apart entirely. It began with the heroic actions of the Barbarossa brothers, defenders of the Muslim cause against Christian fleets, and culminated in the Algerians’ appeal to the Ottoman sultan to repel the Spanish threat; thus, the Regency of Algiers was officially integrated into the Empire in 1518.

In Tunisia, interest in Ottoman history appeared early, paving the way for a renewal of Arab studies on the Ottoman provinces.

Contemporary testimonies

As Muhammad al-Khayr Abd al-Qadir writes in “The Catastrophe of the Arab Nation with the Fall of the Ottoman Caliphate,” the term “Ottomans” had no ethnic connotation; it was equivalent to “Abbasids,” “Umayyads” or “Seljuks.” The Turks defined themselves primarily as Muslims, loyal to Islam; as for those whom we now call “Arabs,” they did not perceive themselves as distinct from the Turks.

Egyptian historian Abd al-ʿAziz al-Shinnawi, in his work “The Ottoman State, a Slandered Islamic State,” emphasizes that the Arabs never regarded the Ottoman Empire as a foreign power nor its rule as a form of colonialism. This religious and political awareness dominated Arab mentality until the early twentieth century.

Another eloquent testimony comes from the great Palestinian historian Anis Sayigh, who affirms in “The Hashemites and the Question of Palestine” that the religious bond was the strongest tie uniting the Arab masses with the Ottoman state.

In sum, the Arabs perceived the Ottoman dynasty as they had the Umayyads or Abbasids. Had they viewed it as foreign or colonial, uprisings would have engulfed the Arab world; yet such revolts occurred only in certain marginal regions, often under the influence of bandits or minorities (a subject masterfully studied by Canadian scholar Stefan Winter), or when Ottoman power, undermined by decay and European intrigues, collapsed under the weight of the false promises of an Arab caliphate supposed to arise from its ruins.

Türkiye, AK Party

Finally, it is worth noting that the rise of the Justice and Development Party ( AK Party) to power in Türkiye at the beginning of the 21st century, followed by a period of openness and renewed ties with the Arab world after decades of political and cultural rupture, helped to soften the negative image of the Ottomans long embedded in Arab consciousness and culture. This unfavorable image had gained strength due to the ideological support it received from regimes such as the Baath Party and other movements hostile to the Islamic heritage.

The rise of academic studies, the popularity of historical Turkish dramas, notably the series “Resurrection: Ertuğrul and The Magnificent Century,” and the country’s touristic openness to Arab visitors all played a decisive role in rehabilitating Ottoman memory and rediscovering a long-suppressed past.

Thus, distrust toward the Turks and their imperial past stems from a modern political construction, foreign to popular sentiment. Contemporary Arab bibliography abounds with hundreds of studies, theses, and monographs devoted to Ottoman history, highlighting its merits, examining its foundations with rigor, and refuting, with documented evidence, the hostile prejudices aimed at discrediting Islamic history as a whole.