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Clashes erupted between Pakistan and Afghanistan, located at the intersection of South and Central Asia, on Oct. 9, 2025. Pakistani warplanes conducted airstrikes targeting the leadership and infrastructure of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a group operating within Afghan territory. The government in Islamabad announced that the operation had been carried out within the framework of self-defense. According to Pakistan, TTP-affiliated groups have planned and executed over 600 attacks against Pakistani security forces from Afghan soil since 2015.
Conversely, the Taliban administration in Afghanistan deemed the attacks a violation of its sovereignty. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid emphasized that Afghan territory cannot be used against Pakistan and alleged that the airstrikes resulted in civilian casualties. The clashes concluded with a cease-fire agreement signed in Doha, the capital of Qatar, on Oct. 18, 2025, under the mediation of Türkiye and Qatar.
To achieve a lasting cease-fire, the first meeting of the technical committee established by the parties began in Istanbul on Oct. 25, 2025, and continued for four days. Pakistan’s minister of Information, Attaullah Tarar, announced in an official statement posted on his X account on Oct. 29, 2025, that the four-day negotiations had ended without result. Tarar stated that the talks in Istanbul revolved around a single agenda item – Pakistan’s request for the Taliban administration to take concrete steps to prevent Afghan territory from being used by the TTP as a training and logistical base for terrorist attacks against Pakistan. However, it was reported that the Afghan side diverted from the core issue and attempted to shift the negotiation process to other matters, leading to the failure of the talks.
Nevertheless, according to media reports published on Oct. 30, 2025, the parties are expected to resume negotiations in Istanbul under Türkiye’s mediation.
Borders, ideology, TTP
The foundation of the Pakistan-Afghanistan tension lies in historical and border-related issues. The 2,640-kilometer (1,640-mile) Durand Line constitutes the oldest and most fundamental cause of this friction. The Durand Line was signed in 1893 between Sir Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary of British India, and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan. The British aimed to create a buffer zone for India in the context of the “Great Game,” their rivalry with Russia.
The Durand Line divided the region’s largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns, leading to the distribution of the same tribes across both Pakistani and Afghan territories. This situation has continually generated tension between national identity and tribal allegiance in the border region. Legally, while Pakistan accepted the Durand Line as the official border after gaining independence in 1947, the Afghan governments have viewed the line as a colonial imposition and have never officially recognized it. This legal disparity is the primary reason for the Taliban’s reaction to current efforts to construct border fences.
The immediate cause of the recent clashes lies in the ideological proximity between the Taliban and TTP. Formed in 2007 through the merger of various militant groups in Pakistan, the TTP seeks to overthrow the Pakistani state and establish a Shariah-based administration. The Taliban and the TTP consider each other “brothers” due to shared ideological objectives and their common Pashtun identity, which complicates the security dynamics between the two countries.
The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021 marked a critical turning point for the TTP, enabling the group to find sanctuary and operate from Afghan territory. This development heightened Pakistan’s security concerns, transforming the issue from a border-related dispute into a multilayered crisis in which sovereignty, ethnic identity and regional security interests have become deeply intertwined.
Context of international law
The recent clashes can be assessed within the international law framework of the prohibition on the use of force and the right to self-defense. Article 2 of the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force by states against one another, a principle underpinned by the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Afghanistan’s condemnation of the Pakistani strikes as a violation of sovereignty aligns with a potential breach of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
However, the U.N. Charter also sets forth exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force: the right to self-defense and authorization by the Security Council. According to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, a state has the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against it, until the Security Council takes action. In this context, Pakistan may justify its operations against the TTP operating from Afghan territory based on self-defense.
The application of the right to self-defense, as traditionally interpreted under Article 51, requires the armed attack to be attributable to a state. Since Pakistan’s strikes targeted nonstate actors like the TTP, the legal justification remains debatable. In the context of international law on state responsibility, for Pakistan to invoke self-defense, Afghanistan would need to demonstrate “substantial involvement” and “effective control” over the TTP’s actions. Mere logistical or arms support by Afghanistan to the TTP is not considered an armed attack, according to the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Nicaragua Judgement.
On the other hand, the post-9/11 international community has increasingly adopted the view that intense and effective attacks by nonstate actors can be classified as an armed attack, provided they meet certain criteria. Within this framework, Pakistan’s right to use force against the TTP can be interpreted as trans-border self-defense under the “unwilling or unable state” doctrine, a developing approach in international law, given Afghanistan’s inability or unwillingness to control the TTP.
Actions of self-defense must be necessary and proportionate to counter the attack. They must not be punitive or excessively interventionist in nature. Whether Pakistan’s airstrikes were proportionate to the TTP’s attacks and whether they carried a punitive purpose beyond repelling the aggressors are the fundamental criteria determining their legal legitimacy. In customary international law, the right to anticipatory self-defense may also be accepted if the threat is imminent or about to materialize.
Prospect for lasting peace
The conflict is fundamentally rooted in the British legacy of the Durand Line and the inherent border security challenges that stem from it. Internal instability in Afghanistan directly affects Pakistan’s security policies and the presence of armed groups such as the TTP operating from Afghan territory poses a continuous threat to Pakistan’s national security. Pakistan is concerned that the Taliban administration is not preventing TTP attacks, whereas the Taliban strongly react to Pakistan’s border restrictions and attempts to construct fences.
At the same time, Pakistan provided the Taliban with a safe haven for nearly 20 years during their struggle against the United States. During this period, Taliban members organized themselves in Pakistani cities such as Quetta, Peshawar and Karachi, and a significant number of Taliban leaders, including Mullah Muhammad Omar, were educated in educational institutions in Pakistan. Pakistan offered an environment that enabled the Taliban to reorganize and regain strength and without Pakistan’s support, it would have been extremely difficult for the Taliban to achieve success.
Therefore, this historically close relationship between the parties may facilitate compromises in resolving current disagreements. However, lasting peace can only be achieved by eliminating the underlying factors that generate tension.
In conclusion, the Pakistan-Afghanistan clashes illustrate a multilayered crisis in which border disputes, ethnic identity and ideological ties are closely intertwined. Lasting peace requires addressing historical grievances, ensuring border security and promoting regional cooperation.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance, values or position of Daily Sabah. The newspaper provides space for diverse perspectives as part of its commitment to open and informed public discussion.
