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As the Russia-Ukraine war drags on, nuclear tension in the international arena continues to intensify. This issue is not limited merely to states engaging in an arms race or threatening each other with nuclear tests; it also represents a process targeting individuals and the future itself, reigniting the “balance of terror” and the possibility of mutual destruction. From this perspective, the United States’ shift from a “Department of Defense” mindset to what can now be described as a “Department of War” reflects a paradigmatic transformation within the global system. However, one must ask: is this merely a strategic manoeuvre intended to strengthen the rhetoric of competing sides, or has it evolved into an actual reality reinforced by concrete military developments and on-the-ground implications?
Regardless of the broader context, U.S. President Donald Trump has effectively announced a new nuclear doctrine by declaring that the U.S. will resume nuclear testing. Nevertheless, what was the nuclear doctrine in the past, and what is it turning into now? This question marks one of the critical turning points that will shape the future of the global security architecture.
Since the Cold War, the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union evolved into a limited mutual deterrence through cooperation. The 1972 SALT I and ABM Treaties marked significant steps in regulating nuclear systems, although both nations continued to pursue technological superiority. The Soviet Union, in particular, enhanced its MIRV technology, increasing the number of warheads to nearly 10,000 by the late 1980s. SALT II aimed to curb this growth but was suspended after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The 1987 INF Treaty was a significant milestone, requiring the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. In the post-Cold War era, the START I and START II treaties of the 1990s institutionalized arms control between the U.S. and Russia, followed by the New START Treaty in 2010. However, after the Russia-Ukraine war, geopolitical tensions have diminished the treaty’s effectiveness, leading to the suspension of mutual inspections. In 2023, Moscow announced it would suspend its obligations under New START, while Washington began reassessing its deterrent capabilities. The treaty is set to expire in February 2026, with no dialogue initiated on its renewal.
Nuclear arms limitation stands at a historical turning point today. If the New START Treaty is not renewed, a far more chaotic and unstable strategic environment could emerge. Moscow’s use of its nuclear card as a “deterrent shield” demonstrated that nuclear weapons had once again become a serious instrument of power.
Under Russian President Vladimir Putin’s leadership, Russia placed its nuclear capability at the center of its strategy, going beyond conventional military power. This approach had notable repercussions within the global system, particularly on NATO and the West. However, it should not be forgotten that the Russia-Ukraine war can also be interpreted as a result of the “mutual security dilemma.” Since Russia and NATO have once again perceived each other as “the enemy,” the line between defensive and offensive armament has become increasingly blurred.
When Russian officials, especially in October 2022, raised the possibility of using nuclear weapons, it revealed the main objectives behind Moscow’s “nuclear intimidation strategy.” Through this, Russia aimed not only to prevent NATO’s direct involvement in the war but also to limit Western military support to Ukraine. In this context, the use of long-range missile systems or advanced offensive weapons has always been considered a “red line” for Russia.
However, the changing nature of warfare has shown that low-cost but high-impact tools can also cause significant destruction. The most striking example of this was the “Spider Web Operation” carried out by Ukraine on June 1, just before the Istanbul mediation talks. This incident demonstrated that nuclear deterrence, if not through direct action on the battlefield, has regained strength on a rhetorical level, showing that Moscow has begun to use its nuclear arsenal more visibly as a strategic instrument of signalling.
The main reason I refer to the drone example is that we must now begin to ask whether nuclear attacks could be carried out via drones in the near future. Although current algorithmic and computational limitations seem to prevent such a possibility, Russia’s recent Burevestnik and Poseidon tests indicate that a critical threshold has already been crossed. We are now witnessing the development of nuclear-powered missiles with no range or distance limits, a reality that renders the entire global security system increasingly fragile and dangerous.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has also intensified its nuclear rhetoric by adopting a more confrontational and militarized posture rather than fostering new avenues for peace. Following statements about resuming nuclear tests, Donald Trump declared that “the U.S. possesses more nuclear weapons than any other country,” signalling that Washington, too, does not intend to fall behind in this new phase of strategic competition. It should not be overlooked that Trump reportedly instructed the Pentagon in late October to resume nuclear testing in Nevada. Taken together, these developments suggest that the boundaries in the nuclear domain may completely disappear in the near future, ushering in a new era of escalation comparable to the Manhattan Project, one that could once again upend the entire global order.
In the final stage of World War II, the two nuclear bombs, Little Boy and Fat Man, dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not merely military strikes intended to force Japan’s surrender; they were turning points that fundamentally reshaped the course of human history. Approximately 70% of Hiroshima and 40% of Nagasaki were obliterated within seconds, while the explosions generated temperatures close to 3000 degrees Celsius (5432 degrees Farenhiet), instantly vaporising people, buildings and all living matter. More than 100,000 individuals died immediately and the death toll multiplied in the following months due to radiation exposure. Today, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are not only geographical locations; they stand as the living memory of how humanity can spiral into annihilation when nuclear power escapes moral and political restraint.
In a world where nuclear armament threatens to evolve into an unrestricted race, the question of whether future generations will even exist becomes inescapably relevant. Specific red lines must never be crossed, and the nuclear threshold stands foremost among them. Regardless of how dominant notions such as deterrence, coercion or strategic signalling may be, one cannot overlook the gravity of a weapons category whose endpoint is mass destruction. The enduring lesson is clear: nuclear power is far more than a military capability; it is an ethical, psychological and political test of humanity’s very existence. Any misstep in this domain risks not only the security of states but also the irreversible endangerment of humanity’s collective future.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance, values or position of Daily Sabah. The newspaper provides space for diverse perspectives as part of its commitment to open and informed public discussion.