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Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s diplomatic visit to the U.S., at the invitation of President Donald Trump, marked a historic milestone. Even disregarding the current state of al-Sharaa’s government or the fact that the country is just emerging from civil war, the visit holds immense significance for Syrian history: He is the first Syrian leader ever to be hosted at the White House. The visit’s timing, just two days after al-Shaara was removed from the U.S.’ “global terrorist” list, makes it particularly noteworthy. Beyond its symbolic and historical weight, al-Sharaa’s agenda was also packed with critical issues: the lifting of American sanctions, the cessation of Israeli attacks and the integration of the PKK/YPG’s Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian army.
So, what tangible outcomes were there for Syria? What is the significance of U.S. relations within the new foreign policy Syria is attempting to build? What steps will the Trump administration take regarding Israeli aggression and SDF integration? Examining these questions will illuminate the path forward for the Damascus government’s capacity-building and Syria’s reconstruction.
Forging a new foreign policy
Syria’s new foreign policy is predicated on a delicate balance. This policy necessitates navigating the delicate balance between Russia and the U.S. while simultaneously fostering close ties with Türkiye. While Syria is dependent on the Gulf’s economic support for reconstruction, the unresolved issue of Israeli occupation also looms large. The Damascus government is thus attempting to leverage foreign policy overtures to gain the capability and maneuvering room needed to solve its domestic problems.
It is crucial to recognize that solutions to Syria’s domestic problems are inherently linked to the policies and relationships of regional and global actors. For instance, calming the separatist Druze issue in Suwayda requires Israel to cease its attacks and its support for the Druze. Alternatively, solving the YPG/SDF problem necessitates the U.S. cutting its support for the organization. Alternatively, a large-scale operation against the YPG/SDF would require comprehensive support from Ankara for the Damascus government.
In essence, the Damascus government is engaging in diplomacy to strengthen its national sovereignty and central authority, while seeking the economic and diplomatic support vital to reconstruction. Syrian foreign policy is being shaped within this framework of expectations and determinants.
Outcomes of the visit
Under the Assad regime, Syria’s relations with the U.S. were minimal. The regime was closely aligned with Russia and Iran, placing it in direct opposition to the U.S., to the extent of being categorized as a “state sponsor of terrorism.” Al-Shaara is, in effect, building U.S.-Syria relations from scratch. Establishing mutual trust and shaping the new government’s image are critical components of this process.
Regarding economic sanctions as the visit’s most critical agenda item, Damascus fell short of its primary goal. The objective was the complete lifting of sanctions; the result was a 180-day suspension. This is far from an ideal scenario, as the sanctions are not permanently lifted and foreign investment remains restricted. Consequently, diplomatic and lobbying efforts for a full repeal are expected to continue. Nonetheless, Trump arguably did as much as he could through executive authority. The main obstacle to the Caesar Act is that it is a law, meaning its permanent repeal requires a congressional vote. In an era of budget crises, government shutdowns, and heightened partisan tension in the U.S. Congress, it is unrealistic to expect Congress to act on a non-central foreign policy issue like Syria. In truth, Syria itself holds little intrinsic value in Trump’s regional vision. Its importance to Washington is secondary; its value stems from the context of relations with Turkiye and Israel’s security.
Another outcome from the visit was Damascus’ agreement to join the anti-Daesh coalition, which is of great importance. Daesh was, after all, the organization that inflicted the most damage on the Syrian opposition during the civil war, and the opposition’s fight against the terrorist group dates back years. While this is not a new development, Damascus’ joining the coalition is valuable as it demonstrates respect for U.S. policy priorities and a willingness to meet U.S. demands. This move also strengthens the central authority’s hand against the YPG/SDF. While not a breakthrough, it is undoubtedly a gambit that will increase Damascus’ leverage at the bargaining table. However, it must not be overlooked that this participation is political, involving intelligence sharing and operational coordination, rather than military. Thus, the ideal scenario did not materialize, though it may become possible in the future.
Israel problem
Israel’s maximalist demands persist. With the new territories it occupied after Dec. 8, in addition to the Golan Heights (occupied since 1967), Israel continues to pose a significant threat to Syria’s southern border. Furthermore, with its support for separatist Druze and its air raids on Syria, it is an actor actively working to prolong the country’s instability.
Al-Shaara’s position is unequivocal: The south of Damascus is non-negotiable, Israel must withdraw from the lands it occupied after Dec. 8, and any agreement that violates Damascus’ authority and national sovereignty is unacceptable. Joining the Abraham Accords is impossible; Syria’s circumstances differ from those of other Arab nations. It is not feasible to sign such an agreement while Israel occupies Syrian land. Therefore, for Syria, a security and non-aggression pact is more appropriate than the Abraham Accords.
The U.S., despite these crisis points, is pushing an agenda by pressuring Damascus to join the Abraham Accords. This deadlock is driven by the “Israel-centric” security approach and Israel’s influence on U.S. policy. If the U.S. desires a security agreement, it must force Israel into a more reasonable position.
SDF’s integration impasse
The SDF’s uncompromising stance remains a major obstacle. The parties, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, confirmed their commitment to the March 10 agreement and the integration process during a side meeting. However, the SDF’s demands are creating problems. These include the desire to join the army as a single bloc; demands for extensive local autonomy akin to federalism, and the fact that, after eight months, oil fields and Daesh camps have still not been transferred to the central government. Despite symbolic pledges of loyalty, they have offered no tangible concessions in practice.
The U.S., meanwhile, is not applying sufficient pressure to force the SDF’s integration. At this point, Israel’s influence on U.S. policy cannot be ignored. While the Trump administration’s stated approach is to resolve the issue quickly and build a stable Damascus government, the YPG’s existence and Israel’s attacks continue to undermine this. The solution, therefore, hinges on the U.S. disengaging itself from Israeli influence and demonstrating the will to implement its regional vision. Considering Trump views Turkiye as the key to Syria, the outcome would likely be shaped by the extent to which Turkiye’s approach of “giving Damascus a chance” is allowed to succeed.
If the Trump administration fails to constrain Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the Syria issue, it is clear Israel will not back down. Israel’s insistence on its “freedom of operation,” its desire for open airspace over Syria and Iraq to strike adversaries, chiefly Iran, seems unlikely to wane. However, just as the U.S. stood by Israel during the Cold War’s Arab-Israeli wars, a policy that pushed Egypt and Syria into the arms of the USSR, if the U.S. repeats this error, it will sabotage the very approach of mutual respect the al-Sharaa government is trying to build and doom U.S.-Syria relations before they even begin.
Ultimately, al-Sharaa’s White House visit was a development that has marginally strengthened the Damascus government’s hand. Beyond its symbolic importance, this visit has clearly increased Damascus’ bargaining power, yielding tangible gains and advancing some issues toward resolution, even if not fully resolved. The YPG/SDF has so far failed to read the post-civil war order correctly. Should it also fail to accurately read this new strengthening of Damascus, a scenario where the negotiating table collapses and Ankara and Damascus act jointly to impose central authority on the terrorist organization is by no means far-fetched.
At that juncture, except possibly Israel and the PKK/YPG terrorist organization’s propaganda, no actor will be able to claim that Ankara and Damascus did not exhaust all peaceful methods for solving the issues.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance, values or position of Daily Sabah. The newspaper provides space for diverse perspectives as part of its commitment to open and informed public discussion.
