Physical Address
Indirizzo: Via Mario Greco 60, Buttigliera Alta, 10090, Torino, Italy
Physical Address
Indirizzo: Via Mario Greco 60, Buttigliera Alta, 10090, Torino, Italy

The relationship between South Korea and Türkiye has always carried a weight far deeper than conventional diplomacy. From the earliest encounters 1,500 years ago – when the Göktürk Khaganate supported the Korean kingdom of Goguryeo – to the defining moment of the Korean War, where Turkish troops fought and died for a distant nation they had never seen, the two countries have repeatedly rediscovered each other across geography and time.
Yet despite the emotional closeness and the rhetoric of “blood brotherhood,” something paradoxical lingered beneath the surface: high-level political engagement never quite matched the depth of the sentiment. Korea had not sent a president to Türkiye since 2012. A scheduled visit in 2020 was canceled due to COVID-19. More than 10 years passed without a Korean head of state setting foot in Ankara, a silence that felt strangely at odds with the countries’ proclaimed bond.
This is why President Lee Jae-myung’s 2025 state visit was more than a diplomatic courtesy; it was the closing of a long and uncomfortable gap. For Türkiye, which had consistently shown interest in strengthening ties, the visit symbolized recognition and reciprocity. For Korea, it signaled a renewed seriousness and a commitment to elevate a relationship that had always deserved more than mere symbolic gestures.
What emerged from Ankara during this visit was not just symbolism but substance. The signing of memoranda of understanding (MoUs) by South Korea and Türkiye, covering defense cooperation, nuclear energy, high-tech industries, infrastructure, finance and green energy, marked the most comprehensive upgrading for bilateral collaboration in decades. Though the emotional foundations of the relationship have always been strong, these agreements reflect something new: a deliberate, future-focused partnership shaped by strategic necessity as much as shared history.
In many ways, the timing could not be more appropriate. The international system is becoming more polarized, more fragmented, and increasingly defined by the rivalries of major powers. In such an environment, middle powers like South Korea and Türkiye – countries with regional influence, advanced industrial capacity, and pragmatic foreign policy instincts – play a critical stabilizing role. Both countries understand that they cannot afford passivity. Instead, they must actively shape the strategic landscape around them. This summit became a reflection of that shared mindset.
Among the various agreements, defense cooperation stands out as the clearest expression of complementary strengths. South Korea has become one of the world’s leading defense producers, particularly in naval vessels, submarines, missiles and next-generation aerospace systems. Türkiye, meanwhile, has rapidly built a highly capable defense ecosystem and has expressed a clear desire to strengthen its naval capacity, traditionally the weakest of its three branches.
For Ankara, Korean expertise in shipbuilding and submarine construction offers precisely the kind of partnership that aligns with its long-term modernization goals. For Seoul, Türkiye represents an industrially competent and politically willing partner capable of co-development, co-production and long-term strategic alignment.
Energy represents the second major axis of cooperation. Türkiye’s ambition to diversify its energy portfolio and strengthen long-term energy security has made nuclear power a central priority. South Korea, with one of the world’s most proven and efficient nuclear construction models, is a natural partner.
Discussions surrounding South Korea’s potential participation in the Sinop Nuclear Power Plant point toward a collaboration that could last decades and reshape Türkiye’s energy landscape. For South Korea, it represents an opportunity to expand its global nuclear footprint; for Türkiye, it brings technological reliability and strategic independence.
But what makes the 2025 MoUs particularly meaningful is their breadth. Beyond defense and nuclear energy, they extend into digital transformation, artificial intelligence, biotechnologies, smart manufacturing, renewable energy and the green-hydrogen economy. With South Korea’s limited land availability for large-scale renewable projects, Türkiye’s vast solar, wind, and geothermal resources create a perfect match. Likewise, Türkiye’s rising status as a regional energy hub aligns naturally with South Korea’s ambitions to secure diversified, stable energy supply lines. In this sense, green-energy cooperation is not merely environmental, but also an economic and geopolitical strategy.

A summit also shapes public sentiment, and this one did so in a uniquely positive way. In both countries, people tend to see the other through a warm and almost familial lens. Koreans frequently describe Turks as sincere, warm-hearted and courageous – perceptions rooted in wartime memory but reinforced today through tourism, cultural content and student exchange. Turks, too, often express a distinct affection toward South Korea, inspired by shared historical narratives and South Korea’s technological rise. Because the relationship has never been burdened by conflict or competing interests, the public in both countries naturally responds with optimism whenever leaders meet.
Still, the true test of any MoU lies in implementation. The risks are real: bureaucratic delays, regulatory differences, shifting political priorities and complex financing structures can all slow down or derail ambitious cooperation. In areas like defense and nuclear energy, technical regulations and export controls add additional layers of difficulty.
To translate agreements into reality, South Korea and Türkiye will need clear roadmaps, joint working groups, aligned standards, and strong involvement from the private sector. Without sustained political will, even the most promising MoU can remain a document rather than a project.
However, if the momentum generated by the summit continues, and if both governments treat these agreements as starting points rather than end points, the potential impact is enormous. What we are witnessing is not simply another chapter in South Korea-Türkiye relations, but a redefinition of the partnership itself. It is a shift from symbolic brotherhood to strategic collaboration; from shared memory to shared ambition.
The 2025 MoUs make one thing clear: the relationship is no longer anchored only in what the two countries once meant to each other. It is now equally anchored in what they can build together – in defense, energy, technology and shaping the future of their regions. For two nations that rediscovered one another across continents centuries ago, this new era of cooperation feels not only strategic but historically fitting.
If history gave Korea and Türkiye the foundation of brotherhood, the 2025 summit has given them the blueprint for a truly strategic partnership – one capable of shaping industries, influencing regional security, and redefining the role of middle powers in a changing world. And for the first time in a long time, the relationship now points not only to a shared past, but toward a shared future.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance, values or position of Daily Sabah. The newspaper provides space for diverse perspectives as part of its commitment to open and informed public discussion.