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Syria’s relationship with China is entering a transformative new phase. In early November 2025, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani may make his first official visit to Beijing, marking a high-profile diplomatic engagement between Damascus and one of its most powerful international partners. This visit comes less than a year after the regime change of Dec. 8, 2024, and reflects Damascus’s broader effort to reposition itself on the global stage. Both Syria and China are recalibrating ties that were forged under very different circumstances, seeking common ground amid new geopolitical realities. On the agenda are ambitious goals: securing Chinese support for Syria’s reconstruction amid the war-torn country’s reconstruction, bolstering Damascus’s international legitimacy, and aligning Syria within a more multipolar regional order.
Relations after regime change
For more than a decade, China had been one of the most reliable diplomatic supporters of the Assad regime, using its U.N. Security Council veto to shield Damascus from Western-backed resolutions and sanctions. In 2023, Beijing elevated relations with Assad to a “strategic partnership,” despite his government’s isolation and the war’s devastating human toll. This legacy now shapes how both sides are redefining their relationship after the fall of Assad. The new Syrian leadership, under interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, seeks to rebuild ties with Beijing on a new footing, one centered on reconstruction and balanced diplomacy rather than wartime patronage.
Since early 2025, Beijing has moved cautiously to reopen diplomatic and economic channels. Chinese officials signaled their readiness to engage the new government, emphasizing counterterrorism cooperation and stability. For Syria, engaging China offers access to a powerful U.N. Security Council member capable of easing its return to international legitimacy. Beijing’s engagement with the interim authorities in early 2025 marked an important step toward cautious normalization. China held diplomatic meetings with Syrian representatives and expressed willingness to discuss limited sanctions relief if the new government demonstrated commitment to inclusivity and peacebuilding.
The regime change in December 2024 reshaped Syria’s diplomatic map. Al-Sharaa’s government has sought to rebuild regional relations without aligning under any single axis of power. This new “balanced diplomacy” envisions Syria as a sovereign actor, restoring relations with neighbors and distancing itself from the geopolitical polarization of the civil war years. In this context, China appears as an appealing and realistic partner; unlike Iran or Russia, whose deep involvement in the war left lasting divisions in the region.
China’s posture in post-Assad Syria has been one of cautious pragmatism. While maintaining its rhetorical emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference, Beijing recognizes that Syria’s long-term stability aligns with its broader Belt and Road vision across the Middle East. Unlike Moscow or Tehran, Beijing does not seek direct control over military or political affairs but aims to shape Syria’s recovery through economic and institutional cooperation. This approach also allows China to expand its influence without the political risks of deep intervention.
Beijing’s stance has been warmly received in Damascus. China’s permanent representative to the U.N., Fu Cong, reiterated in mid-2025 that Beijing supports Syria’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as well as its reconstruction, while opposing Israeli airstrikes on Syrian territory. At the same time, China remains careful not to overcommit militarily, preferring to use diplomatic and economic tools to reinforce its presence. This balance enables Beijing to appear as a stabilizing force, acceptable to a range of regional actors from the Gulf to Türkiye.
Economic reconstruction, coop
Reconstruction remains the most urgent dimension of Syria-China relations. After 12 years of conflict, Syria’s rebuilding cost is estimated to be more than $250 billion. The Syrian government sees Chinese participation as essential to restoring infrastructure, energy systems and industrial production. In October 2025, the Queen Vivian ship delivered 16,000 tons of steel and equipment from China to Syria; the first direct shipment since the war. During al-Shaibani’s visit, Damascus is expected to present a road map for bilateral economic cooperation focused on energy, telecommunications, transport and industrial development.
In mid-2025, Syria signed a major investment deal with Fidi Contracting, a China-linked company, to develop industrial zones in Homs and near Damascus. The agreement grants over 1 million square meters in Syria’s free zones for the construction of industrial and service complexes over 20 years. Syrian officials hailed the deal as a symbol of renewed foreign confidence in the new government and as China’s first significant post-Assad investment. Chinese consumer goods, long present in Syrian markets, continue to flow through informal trade routes, with potential for formal expansion as conditions stabilize. Any Chinese-Syrian cooperation will inevitably intersect with Türkiye’s strategic role in northern Syria and in shaping regional reconstruction logistics, given Ankara’s control over key border crossings and its involvement in infrastructure corridors.
Nevertheless, Beijing’s engagement remains measured. Chinese diplomats have stressed that reconstruction aid must come without political preconditions, a veiled critique of Western donors linking funding to political reforms. At the same time, Beijing expects the Syrian government to maintain stability, ensure transparency and prevent corruption. Chinese U.N. representatives have urged the international community to support Syria’s recovery while calling for a “comprehensive and inclusive transition.”
Security concerns
Beijing’s engagement with Syria is not purely economic. A key component of China’s security concern is the presence of Uyghurs affiliated with the Syrian civil war in northern Syria. Based on different resources, approximately thousands of Uyghurs from Xinjiang joined Syrian opposition factions during the civil war, and some remain entrenched in Idlib and Aleppo provinces. China views these militants as a direct threat to its national security, fearing their return to Chinese territory or influence over transnational extremist networks. During al-Shaibani’s upcoming meetings in Beijing, Chinese officials are expected to raise the issue explicitly and press for concrete assurances from Damascus that Uyghur fighters will not be integrated into the new Syrian military or local governance structures. In exchange, China may offer enhanced support for Syria in international institutions; potentially backing efforts to lift remaining international sanctions or expand humanitarian assistance.
Al-Shaibani’s visit represents both symbolism and substance. It marks a significant step toward diplomatic normalization. The two sides are expected to sign memoranda on infrastructure, trade, education and renewable energy cooperation. A joint communique will likely reaffirm the “strategic partnership,” updated to fit the post-Assad reality, emphasizing mutual respect, adherence to the one-China policy, and China’s support for Syria’s unity and reconstruction.
If Beijing extends even limited financial mechanisms, such as a credit line or AIIB-linked funding, this would mark a major milestone for Syria’s economic rehabilitation. However, both sides are aware of the challenges ahead: corruption risks, security instability and geopolitical sensitivities involving the West and regional rivals. China’s policy of cautious engagement aims to balance opportunity with restraint, ensuring its interests are protected while promoting stability.
The renewed partnership between China and Syria embodies the spirit of a shifting international order. For Damascus, engaging Beijing provides access to investment and diplomatic backing without the conditionality imposed by Western powers. For Beijing, Syria offers an opportunity to project influence across the Levant and demonstrate its capacity as a global problem-solver. The success of this cooperation will depend less on grand declarations and more on sustained, measurable progress. As the world’s balance of power tilts toward multipolarity, the evolving Syria-China relationship may stand as a microcosm of that transformation. November 2025 could thus be remembered as the moment when both nations, emerging from years of crisis, charted a new course together.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance, values or position of Daily Sabah. The newspaper provides space for diverse perspectives as part of its commitment to open and informed public discussion.
