Physical Address
Indirizzo: Via Mario Greco 60, Buttigliera Alta, 10090, Torino, Italy
Physical Address
Indirizzo: Via Mario Greco 60, Buttigliera Alta, 10090, Torino, Italy

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s latest tour of Kuwait, Qatar and Oman came when the Middle East is again reshaped by war, diplomacy and shifting alliances. These visits were not just ceremonial trips. They reflected a deliberate effort by Ankara to consolidate its influence in a region where economic ties and strategic cooperation now overlap more than ever.
The timing was telling. Israel’s genocide in Gaza has exposed deep fractures in the regional order. While the fragile cease-fire has temporarily slowed the violence, it has also reminded Arab capitals that silence carries a political cost. In this atmosphere, Erdoğan’s Gulf diplomacy showcased what Ankara calls “leadership diplomacy” – a blend of pragmatic dialogue and moral positioning.
The agenda went far beyond trade. In fact, this time, economics was secondary to politics. Türkiye sought to strengthen its alignment with Gulf partners on several fronts: to ensure the permanence of the Gaza cease-fire, to reinforce collective Arab-Turkish coordination, and to further develop defense and technology cooperation mechanisms. Discussions also touched on Türkiye’s potential role in the region’s emerging security architecture and its interest in acquiring Eurofighter jets – a reminder that Ankara’s strategic calculus stretches well beyond the Middle East.
This tour differs from Erdoğan’s previous Gulf engagements because of its tone and depth. The usual “trade diplomacy” gives way to something broader: a long-term framework combining economic interdependence with shared regional responsibility. Ankara now speaks less about short-term investment deals and more about institutionalized cooperation, especially in areas where the Gulf’s financial power and Türkiye’s production capacity can complement each other.
Still, economics remains a critical layer of the picture. Türkiye seeks to attract Gulf capitals into the manufacturing, logistics and defense sectors by strengthening investment and energy partnerships. Agreements signed with Kuwait and Qatar are designed to ensure sustainable capital flows, while new infrastructure links through Oman could tie the Gulf more closely to Türkiye’s East-West trade vision. If realized, a secure “logistics corridor” stretching from Anatolia through the Gulf to the Indian Ocean could reshape regional connectivity.
Another pillar of the trip was defense and security. Türkiye’s rapidly growing defense industry is no longer just about national pride; it has become a foreign policy instrument. With its appetite for advanced technology and reliable partners, the Gulf is a natural market. Beyond existing cooperation with Qatar, Ankara now eyes joint production and technology-sharing models with Oman and Kuwait, signaling a move from transactional defense sales to deeper strategic integration.
At its core, Erdoğan’s tour underscored one message: regional crises require regional solutions. The humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and the potential collapse of the cease-fire make collective action more urgent than ever. Türkiye’s approach, framed around shared responsibility and multilayered partnerships, seeks to fill the diplomatic vacuum left by others.
Whether the Gulf capitals are ready to embrace this vision remains to be seen. However, one thing is clear: Ankara wants to be a stakeholder in shaping the region’s future.
Each stop on Erdoğan’s Gulf tour carried its own priorities, yet the overarching message was clear: multidimensional partnership. The visit to the first stop, Kuwait, underscored the country’s traditionally warm ties with Türkiye, with discussions centered on Palestine and regional security. Within Ankara’s vision of “regional ownership,” both sides announced initiatives to strengthen political and economic cooperation and to institutionalize bilateral relations.
A potential Turkish military base in Kuwait – previously debated but never realized – reemerged as a subtle talking point. Such a move, and the growing presence of Turkish defense products, would enhance Kuwait’s security architecture. Moreover, Kuwait’s participation will be vital as Türkiye and Iraq progress with the “Development Road” project. Viewing Türkiye as a “stable regional partner” set the tone for all high-level meetings in Kuwait City.
The trip’s second leg took Erdoğan to Qatar, arguably Türkiye’s closest ally in the region. The Doha visit carried a more strategic weight, with talks focused on defense and regional coordination. The Ankara-Doha axis continues to project itself as a trusted stabilizing force from Afghanistan to Gaza, and the visit reaffirmed the durability of this partnership in a rapidly changing Middle East.
The final stop, Oman, added a distinctly geo-economic flavor to the tour. Discussions revolved around energy, natural resources, logistics corridors, free trade, visa facilitation and joint infrastructure projects. As the “strategic gateway” between the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, Oman is pivotal in a larger economic chain stretching across Asia and the Middle East. Both leaders also reiterated a shared conviction: that peace in Palestine, and by extension the region, must be generated from within, not imposed from outside.
Erdoğan’s Gulf journey, in essence, was not merely about diplomacy or trade. It reflected Ankara’s long-term vision of embedding itself in the region’s evolving architecture, where economics, security, and moral responsibility converge in a single framework.
As Ankara deepens its cooperation with Gulf countries, it sends a clear message to both the West and the Arab world: independent, yet open to collaboration. Erdoğan’s recent visits reveal that Türkiye no longer seeks transactional, interest-based ties in the Gulf. Instead, it is pursuing a new model of partnership built on shared values, norms and strategic vision. The tour, therefore, reflects not mere diplomacy but an emerging phase of Türkiye’s regional strategy: one that is more active, coequal and initiative-driven.
This shift marks a new stage in Türkiye’s broader Middle East vision. Ankara now approaches the region through political rhetoric and a framework of collective regional policies, economic integration, energy security and defense-industry cooperation. The agreements signed with Kuwait, Qatar and Oman demonstrate Türkiye’s intent to establish a long-term, institutional presence in the Gulf. Beyond short-term trade or investment goals, these moves signal an effort to embed a doctrine of regional ownership, a model in which regional actors take primary responsibility for their own security and stability. Such a doctrine gains significance amid the deepening competition between global powers. Whether it concerns Israel’s ongoing aggression and genocidal campaign in Gaza, the reconstruction of Syria, or the fragile dynamics along the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier, regional solutions anchored in shared responsibility could have transformative effects.
Erdoğan’s Gulf tour, therefore, cannot be reduced to a series of economic deals. It represents Ankara’s bid to position itself as an architect of the emerging regional order, a country determined to adapt to change and help design it.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance, values or position of Daily Sabah. The newspaper provides space for diverse perspectives as part of its commitment to open and informed public discussion.