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In the ongoing nuclear reconciliation talks between Iran and the West, the latest venue has become Türkiye, with Istanbul being a crossroad. These actors, who have met numerous times to date, face a fundamental challenge in the global system: the consistent failure to adhere to established boundaries or legal frameworks fully. As is well known, following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the global system came to be perceived by Iran as a Western-centric authority, one increasingly viewed through the lens of adversarial rhetoric. In contrast, Iran during the era of the Pahlavi dynasty presented a markedly different perspective.
The continuation of negotiations between Iran and the West, particularly those left incomplete by the U.S., proceeded with the E3 countries (the U.K., France and Germany). Once again, the address is Istanbul. In addition to Türkiye’s emergence as a mediator and conciliator, its approach and position regarding the nuclear issue are also quite clear. Türkiye offers a stable framework grounded in international law and agreements.
Iran’s nuclear past, realities
Iran’s nuclear activities have a long history, dating back to the Cold War era. Following the destructive impact of nuclear weapons demonstrated during World War II, major powers refrained from taking significant steps without possessing a nuclear deterrent. At the same time, many other actors began to pursue nuclear energy initiatives. However, with the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970, the boundaries for nuclear possession and use were formally established within the global system. Iran, as a signatory to the NPT since 1968, committed itself to the peaceful use of nuclear technology.
Prior to the revolution, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi established the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) and announced plans to produce approximately 23,000 megawatts of energy within 20 years. However, due to the 1979 Islamic Revolution and regional developments such as the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Iran’s nuclear activities remained largely dormant for a considerable period.
The rupture of relations with the United States and the West following the revolution, coupled with the withdrawal of Western companies from projects in Iran, further exacerbated this stagnation. Due to the inherently interest-based nature of international relations, Iran began to seek alternative partners, leading to the establishment of contacts with the Russian Federation in the 1990s. An agreement was established with Russia to finalize the construction of Iran’s first nuclear power reactor at the Bushehr facility, which ultimately began operations in 2011. Nevertheless, the process did not end there. While acquiring nuclear technology, Iran also continued its research and development in various other areas. At this point, it is also essential to recognise China as another key actor in Iran’s nuclear trajectory.
Thus, since the 1990s, Iran has not only shifted its nuclear orientation toward Asia but has also begun to develop relationships that would position it as a new center of gravity in the face of the West. The political dimension of this transformation should not be overlooked. It was the disclosure of the Natanz nuclear facility that triggered renewed Western concern and attention regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Following this revelation, the West’s approach toward Iran’s nuclear ambitions underwent a significant change.
From Natanz to 12-Day war
In 2002, following the revelation of the Natanz facility, the three major European Union countries – the United Kingdom, France and Germany – became actively involved in negotiations with Iran. Known as the EU-3 (or E3), these countries sought to ensure transparency in Iran’s nuclear program and demanded that Iran suspend uranium enrichment. However, the diplomatic efforts between Iran and the EU-3 proved short-lived.
By 2006, the nuclear crisis had acquired a multilateral dimension. The permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, together with Germany, formed the P5+1 format. In June 2006, a group of six countries offered Iran a comprehensive package of economic and political incentives in exchange for halting its nuclear program; however, this initiative also did not achieve lasting success. At the core of the issue was the parties’ mutual perception of hostility. The importance of the Security Council sanctions and the growing international pressure during this period merit recognition.
Throughout this process, Iran’s compliance with its obligations under the NPT and the requirements of relevant agreements has been the subject of ongoing scrutiny. Recognizing the realities of the region and the international system, Türkiye and Brazil took a significant step in 2010. That year, a diplomatic breakthrough was sought under their mediation, culminating in the signing of the Tehran Declaration. However, the West did not support this agreement, and it was ultimately set aside.
Subsequently, in 2013, the parties reached a Joint Plan of Action in Geneva, followed in 2015 by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA established a broad framework, notably limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment to 3%. The agreement was endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. A key feature, however, was the introduction of the “snapback” mechanism, which allowed for the rapid reimposition of U.N. sanctions in the event of a defined violation.
Today, the core issue in the Istanbul negotiations centers around this mechanism. Should the E3 countries invoke snapback in the nuclear talks, Iran is reportedly prepared to activate an alternative plan. Indeed, Iran has recently held discussions with China and Russia, underlining that the process is not solely nuclear in focus but also a consequence of broader political dynamics.
Türkiye’s diplomatic role
Iran, especially during the recent 12-Day war with Israel, witnessed the vulnerability of its intelligence apparatus and proxy actors, leading to a greater awareness of its limitations within the global system. As a result, the “nuclear Iran” question is now not only a technical matter but also one of national prestige. It should be recalled that the outbreak of the 12-Day war undermined the nuclear talks between the U.S. and Iran in Oman in June. The process has thus continued through the E3. Is there a risk of war at this stage? While the “Octopus Doctrine”, a strategy designed to strike Iran at its weakest, suggests a shift in the Middle Eastern security landscape centered on nuclear deterrence, it remains an open question whether the nuclear issue continues to be the principal source of anxiety within the international system.
The main reason is that Türkiye today acts as a central mediator in both the global system and regional politics. At the same time, its careful management of the process between the parties and its emphasis on a stability-oriented approach are also key factors. In addition, political neutrality and geographical proximity play a significant role. In this context, during the talks between Iran and the E3 countries, Türkiye’s diplomatic weight and its position as a knowledgeable actor in the process were decisive. As a result, both sides agreed to continue the negotiations. The absence of harsh steps regarding the snapback mechanism also indicates that the diplomatic channel remains open. Therefore, it would be accurate to say that Türkiye is continuing its initiative, launched in 2010, to harmonize Iran and the West on the nuclear issue.
