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Today, Iraq holds its sixth national parliamentary vote since 2005, yet the public mood is subdued. After two decades of corruption, unemployment and failing services, many voters expect little more than a reshuffle among familiar elites. Prime Minister Mohammed S. Al Sudani seeks a second term on the strength of incremental improvements in security and service delivery. Still, today’s calm looks like an elite bargain that trades real reform for order. With faith in the ballot box eroded, turnout is widely expected to be modest.
The electoral framework itself has tilted the field. Parliament has undone key 2021 reforms by making each province a single, large district and adopting a modified Sainte‑Laguë formula with a high first divisor (1.7). This technical tweak raises the bar for independents and small lists, restoring leverage to party leaders. Baghdad also scrapped out‑of‑country voting, silencing a diaspora that has historically boosted certain blocs, including Kurdish parties. Critics, therefore, warn that 2025 may be the least competitive election since 2005, consolidating the dominance of entrenched factions.
Shiite-Sunni politics
Inside the Shiite camp, the Coordination Framework (CF), a coalition of factions with longstanding ties to Iran, remains the center of gravity. Member parties are competing on separate lists but are widely expected to reunite after the polls to form the largest bloc. The missing counterweight is Muqtada al‑Sadr: his movement, which won the most seats in 2021, withdrew from parliament amid acrimonious coalition bargaining and is now boycotting the process. Without Sadrists in the race, the intra‑Shiite contest is less about nationalist versus pro‑Iran platforms and more about rivalries within the CF itself, most notably between Al Sudani’s allies and figures such as the leader of the Islamic Dawa Party, Nouri al‑Maliki. That dynamic strengthens the likelihood of a Shiite‑led consensus cabinet while keeping the risk alive that Sadr could mobilize street pressure if he deems the outcome illegitimate.
Sunni politics are fragmented. Mohammed al‑Halbousi’s Taqaddum, Khamis al‑Khanjar’s allied lists, and rivals such as Azm all aim to “regain lost ground” after feeling sidelined in the 2022 government formation. Their goals include leverage over key sovereign ministries (notably defense and finance) and reconstruction funding for Sunni‑majority provinces. Although personal and regional rivalries persist, the major Sunni blocs are poised to join whatever consensus emerges rather than mount a formal opposition, reflecting a shared priority to secure influence in Baghdad while ensuring stable representation in the speakership. Persistent distrust, fueled by the presence and conduct of Shiite militia forces in Sunni areas, will continue to shadow negotiations.
Kurds, Turkmens
Kurdish politics remain divided between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The two will bargain separately in Baghdad to safeguard budget entitlements, autonomy and leverage in disputed territories. Nowhere are the stakes higher than in Kirkuk, the oil‑rich, multiethnic province retaken by federal forces after the failed 2017 independence referendum. The KDP has repeatedly sought deals to restore influence there, while Iran‑aligned parties, and local Arab and Turkmen actors work to keep Kirkuk firmly under Baghdad’s control. Absent a post‑election consensus, Kirkuk could once again become a flashpoint that tests the next government’s inclusivity and crisis management.
The Turkmen in Iraq, particularly those concentrated in the north and especially in Kirkuk, have pursued a pragmatic strategy to prevent marginalization. The Iraqi Turkmen are working to increase their representation in the Nov. 11 parliamentary elections in the cities of Kirkuk, Mosul, Salahaddin, Baghdad, Sulaymaniyah, Diyala and Erbil. As an essential step, various Turkmen parties have united under the Iraqi Turkmen Front list and will run in the election under this list. Turkmen candidates are also trying to make their presence felt within the Sunni and Shiite blocs.
In addition, seven Turkmen parties in northern Iraq support the KDP list. There are also claims that these parties are front parties established by the KDP. The parties in question deny the allegations that they are front parties and argue that this is the best opportunity to secure minority rights for the Kurdish-Turkmen partnership in Baghdad, share power in Kirkuk and ensure recognition of the Turkmen language and culture. Ankara, which can be seen as the unofficial guarantor of the Turkmen, welcomes all these initiatives to increase Turkmen representation.
From violence to vote‑buying
Security dynamics will shape both turnout and legitimacy. The campaign period has already seen chilling incidents. On Oct.15, Sunni candidate Safaa al‑Mashhadani was assassinated by a car bomb in Baghdad’s Tarmiya district, and other candidates have reported threats. The government plans to deploy roughly 190,000 police and soldiers on election day, after early voting for security personnel on Nov. 9, while intelligence units remain on high alert against Daesh remnants and potential militia intimidation.
Coercion is not only physical. A black market in biometric voter cards and routine vote‑buying (priced around $100-200 per vote in some districts) feeds deep cynicism. Incumbent advantages, from the misuse of state resources to the rapid expansion of the public payroll in recent years, further blur the line between party and state. The electoral commission has recorded hundreds of violations, but meaningful enforcement is rare; few expect prominent figures to be disqualified. The net effect is to depress participation and reward those with the deepest pockets.
Influence of Türkiye, Iran
Tehran has the most at stake in the election. A stable Shiite‑led coalition in Baghdad preserves a strategic buffer and secures Iran’s corridor to the Levant. Expect Iran to encourage CF unity in post‑election bargaining and to resist sweeping moves to curb Iran‑linked armed groups embedded in Iraq’s security ecosystem. If a new prime minister were to attempt severe curbs under U.S. pressure, Iran could use its influence inside the CF to block them while still preferring outcomes that avoid civil strife that could spill over its borders.
As for Ankara, the election matters through the twin lenses of security and interdependence. Türkiye seeks tighter Baghdad-Erbil coordination against PKK sanctuaries in northern Iraq and favors an inclusive governing formula that brings the KDP to the table. Economically, the late‑September resumption of Kurdistan Region crude exports to Türkiye (roughly 450,000 barrels per day via the Iraq-Türkiye pipeline) eased the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)’s fiscal crunch and restored flows and transit fees, both important to Türkiye. Recent “water diplomacy,” including increased Tigris releases, has aimed to build goodwill for a broader water‑sharing agenda alongside trade and infrastructure projects such as the proposed Basra-Türkiye development corridor.
Any vacuum that may emerge in Baghdad after the elections could weaken border control and embolden Daesh cells in the desert border regions, thereby jeopardizing the security of both Iraq and Syria.
Continuity is base
CF parties coalesce with major Kurdish and Sunni blocs to form a broad “national unity” Cabinet. Al Sudani’s list is favored among Shiite factions. Still, the premiership will, as usual, be decided in post‑election bargaining, and some CF leaders may prefer a weaker prime minister to maximize their institutional control. Either way, policy is likely to prioritize order over disruption: maintaining oil‑revenue arrangements with the KRG, incremental service improvements, and a balanced foreign posture. Yet, the risks are clear. If coalition talks shortchange a major stakeholder (say, the KDP or a leading Sunni bloc), boycotts or protests could follow; if intra‑Shiite rivalries harden, militias could mobilize street pressure; and if Sadr reactivates his movement, Iraq could again face Green Zone‑style crises. These elections are thus less a revolution than a stress test of “managed stability.”
For Türkiye and the wider region, a functional, inclusive government in Baghdad would mean steadier security cooperation, sustained energy flows and a partner capable of gradual reform. For Iraqis, the more urgent test is whether this cycle delivers tangible gains like power, water and jobs without reigniting old fault lines. If it does, skepticism may soften; if it does not, the next crisis may already be in the queue.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance, values or position of Daily Sabah. The newspaper provides space for diverse perspectives as part of its commitment to open and informed public discussion.
