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On the night of November 1, 1954, the National Liberation Front (FLN) launched its first attacks, kicking off the war for Algerian independence. The French colonial authorities, despite the alerts received for months, minimized these events, describing them as simple “terrorist acts”, thus revealing the blindness of the colonial system in the face of the scale of the national movement.
For Khedidja Krimi, lecturer at the University of Algiers 2 and specialist in modern and contemporary history, this date remains engraved in the collective memory as the starting point of a decisive struggle for national sovereignty, shaped by the first French reactions, internal political tensions and the international context.
The Young Independent: How did the French colonial authorities react to the first attacks on 1er November 1954?
Khedidja Krimi: Intelligence services during the colonial era mainly included the 2nd Bureau and the North African Liaison Service (SLNA). These services had the mission of monitoring the so-called Muslim Algerian population, their movements, their contacts, of analyzing the religious and political movements of its elites, and of establishing regular reports. The colonial intelligence system was not limited to collecting information on the movements of Algerians within the country, but went beyond since, according to colonial law, Algerians, wherever they settled, remained subjects subject to France.
This explains the importance of the testimony of Jean Vaujour, director of general security in Algiers from June 1953 to July 1955. In his book From revolt to revolution (Albin Michel, 1985), Jean Vaujour underlines the inaction of the General Government in Algeria, which did not follow up on its reports. The latter were drawn up based on information transmitted by his emissaries in Cairo, Tunisia and Morocco, and did not fail to alert the colonial authorities to the fact that Algeria risked experiencing imminent unrest.
The first reactions of the colonial authorities to the actions carried out on the 1er November 1954 by the National Liberation Front and the National Army (FLN/ALN) confirmed, until proven otherwise, Vaujour’s testimony. A three-page intelligence document, dated November 11, 1954 and written in Constantine, eleven days after the outbreak of the war of liberation, contains information on certain historical leaders of the Revolution and their activities within the national movement, notably within the PPA/MTLD and the Special Organization (OS). Among the names mentioned are Zighoud Youcef, Saïd Boudjeroudi, Krim Belkacem and others.
In another document, written in Annaba and dated November 25, 1954, the editor confirms the desire of the Rotary Club to finance anti-terrorist militias in Annaba. The reports from security agents describing the general situation across most of the territory almost unanimously agree in describing the events of November 1954 as simple terrorist operations carried out by groups of criminals.
This allows us to conclude that the discretion and confidentiality adopted by the activists triggering the 1er November 1954 were essential. The colonial administration, military and civil, only became fully aware that the Algerian people had just launched a merciless war to recover their national sovereignty after having intercepted a few activists in possession of compromising documents.
Were the political movements of the time unanimous as to the content and objectives of the text of 1er November 1954?
Regarding the national movement in Algeria, it is important to emphasize that the Muslim Congress, which was held in the summer of 1936, had a positive impact on the national movement as a whole. The participation of Messali El-Hadj, on August 2 of the same year, made it possible to clearly outline the revolutionary line of conduct to follow, despite the internal quarrels within the revolutionary party and the external pressure represented by imperialism.
This orientation is found in the Proclamation of 1er November 1954: “Placing the national interest above all petty and erroneous considerations of people and prestige, in accordance with revolutionary principles, our action is directed solely against colonialism, alone…”. This shows that the FLN had opened its ranks to all political tendencies, inviting everyone to join its militants, the mujahideen, to serve the national cause.
What events, both internal and international, pushed the PPA-MTLD activists, known as the “22”, to start the Revolution?
We cannot attribute the outbreak of the war of liberation to a specific event, other than the colonial presence itself. The 1er November 1954 truly marks the beginning of the end of the resistance of the Algerian people against the colonialism established since 1830. The massacres perpetrated against civilians in Sétif, Guelma and Kherrata, on the same day as the celebration of the fall, were only one link among many others in the Algerian resistance. The editors of the text addressed to the people clearly indicated this: “…In addition, think a little about your humiliating situation as a colonized person, reduced on his own soil to the shameful condition of a servant and a wretch overexploited by a handful of privileged people…”.
However, the triggering occurred in a favorable international climate, as highlighted in the Proclamation of 1er November 1954: “… on the external level, the climate of détente is favorable for the settlement of minor problems, including ours, especially with the diplomatic support of our Arab and Muslim brothers…”.
What events pushed Algerians to take up arms? Is it the defeat of France at Diên Bien Phu, the massacres of May 8, 1945, or the fraudulent results of the 1947 elections?
The massacres of May 8, 1945, in which all the colonial forces participated to repress demonstrators who came out to celebrate the end of hostilities, left the populations trapped. This genocidal behavior was added to the long list of abuses committed against the Algerian people. For any administration, the ballot box represents the surest universal path to democracy. However, applying this principle in Algeria, with a political party representing a popular mass hostile to colonization, carried great risks of reversing the situation. This explains the electoral fraud of 1947, orchestrated by Naegelen.
As for the battle of Diên Bien Phu, the last bastion of Vietnamese resistance, it inflicted a bitter failure on France, pushing it to withdraw its last soldiers from Vietnamese soil. Despite the many points in common between Vietnamese and Algerian societies (colonization, administration policy, elite activism), the impact of this battle on Algeria was mainly limited to the return of several hundred Algerians incorporated as auxiliaries in the colonial army. This phenomenon, however, indirectly contributed to strengthening the ranks of the National Liberation Army.