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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit held in the Chinese city of Tianjin served as a showcase for multipolarity, making an alternative pole in international politics more visible. Although not widely discussed in the West, interactions among the countries gathered under the SCO were on the agenda in the East.
Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized at the Tianjin summit that global politics is undergoing a comprehensive transformation. However, the fundamental characteristics of this transformation, in his words, are instability, uncertainty and unpredictability. These words reflect the crisis of the current international order and the pains of the search for a new order. The choice of Tianjin as a showcase for China’s advanced development model also reveals that Beijing is offering not only a political but primarily an economic vision.
The broad participation in the summit is a response to the crisis of multilateralism in the era of the U.S. under President Donald Trump’s second term. Washington’s “America First” approach has strengthened the desire for a multipolar order, particularly in the Global South. At a time when the West’s commitment to a rules-based international order is weakening, the Global South is increasingly seeking to deepen its relations with non-Western actors. The picture emerging in Tianjin is noteworthy as China’s attempt to institutionalize this desire and demonstrate its leadership capacity. Almost every participating actor, albeit for different reasons, praised the vision of a multipolar world emerging from Tianjin. However, contrary to this rhetorical unity, it raises questions about the extent to which the multipolarity approach of non-Western actors is sufficient to resolve the current crises in the international order.
Self-centered multipolarity
In theory, multipolarity is presented as a framework that will increase stability and inclusiveness. From this perspective, the SCO demonstrates a strong will for multipolarity. However, the reality, clearly evident in Tianjin, is that each actor pursues a self-centered version of multipolarity, placing its own position at the center. The set of principles expressed as the Shanghai Spirit is a conceptually inclusive concept: loyalty, trust, peace, mutual respect and cooperation. This collective emphasis, which exists at the rhetorical level, functions quite differently in practice.
China adopts an approach that shifts the responsibility for its trade imbalance onto other countries, promoting its own model. Russia markets its war in Ukraine as the legitimate basis for multipolarity. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, the SCO serves as a tool for mitigating the confrontational dynamic with the West. India, despite its competition with China, knows it must approach Beijing under pressure from U.S. policies. But does this rapprochement signal genuine cooperation or a forced strategic balance of caution? It remains impossible to provide definitive answers to these questions.
The SCO is a platform where most of the countries gathered around the same table have serious problems with each other: the China-India border tension, the Pakistan-India rivalry, the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, and the discussions surrounding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The list goes on. This picture shows that the organization wants to be a political position framework rather than a problem-solving structure. However, considering global economic balances, population, diplomatic language and geopolitical context, the place of the SCO in the global system is quite critical.
Two issues were particularly noteworthy at the summit. The first was the step taken toward easing China-India relations. The resumption of direct flights signaled that the two countries had entered a new era dubbed the “reconciliation of the dragon and the elephant.” However, this rapprochement is largely shaped by the imperatives created by coercive U.S. policies. At the same time, border tensions, economic competition and new areas of competition, such as the IMEC corridor proposed by India, are taking these relations to another level. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China for the first time in five years, sitting at the table as the leader of a country whose population has now surpassed China’s. This situation also highlights India’s quest to strengthen its own position and consolidate its strategic depth against Pakistan. The dialogue between Modi, Putin and Xi Jinping stood out as an image reflecting Asia’s new strategic environment.
Secondly, the emphasis on the Global South was expressed more strongly than at previous summits. While China used this rhetoric to reinforce its leadership capacity, other members also sought to gain visibility through this common ground.
Security and counterterrorism issues also featured prominently on the summit agenda. However, differences among members were noticeable under this heading. Russia, a country that has caused the most critical security and geopolitical crisis since the end of the Cold War with its invasion of Ukraine, is trying to shape security cooperation within the SCO framework according to its own agenda. India and Pakistan, two nuclear powers, narrowly avoided war. No member country could stand by Iran in the U.S. and Israel’s military intervention against Iran.
From a normative perspective, the biggest shortcoming is the failure to address the Gaza issue from even a weak solution-oriented perspective. At a time when the legitimacy of the global crisis is being felt, the fact that an issue like Gaza, which deeply affects the international conscience, was not seriously on the agenda reveals the weakness of the SCO’s normative capacity. Apart from President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, no other leader genuinely put Gaza on the agenda.
Türkiye’s third way
Türkiye’s presence in the SCO is not limited to current geopolitical preferences; it also carries strong symbolism. Since becoming a dialogue partner in 2012, Türkiye has sat at the table with states of diverse geopolitical identities. Türkiye does not view the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a pivot or alternative in its foreign policy. Rather, it functions as a paradigm seeking a “third way.” To read Türkiye’s third way strategy as “being caught in the middle” would ignore its deliberate pursuit of strategic balance. Ankara’s approach demonstrates its capacity to navigate multiple alternative geopolitical contexts simultaneously.
The third way strategy is based on Türkiye deepening its relations with the West and increasing its engagement with the SCO ecosystem without committing to a single side. As a NATO member and part of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, Türkiye is also working to strengthen its economic and strategic relations with Asia, particularly China. Through this multilayered diplomacy, Türkiye has become a flexible and agile player in the multipolar world order. It is not only concerned with its own security but also with the broader security of others. More importantly, it advocates for a genuine institutional reform of the international order. For this reason, the platform provided by the SCO is highly valued by Türkiye. President Erdoğan’s support for China’s Global Governance Initiative within the framework of reforming international institutions is important in this regard.
Erdoğan’s meeting with Jinping during the summit brought Türkiye’s strategic importance on the Middle Corridor to Beijing’s agenda, in addition to efforts to close the trade gap between the two countries. Erdoğan’s meeting with Putin was critical not only regarding the Ukraine crisis but also the fragile security environment in Syria. The joint emphasis on Syria’s territorial integrity during the meeting was noteworthy, particularly in light of Moscow’s support for Ankara’s thesis on the new phase in Syria. This could broaden Türkiye’s diplomatic maneuvering room in the ongoing fragility in Syria in the coming period.
Erdoğan also sent a message to strengthen bilateral relations with the Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif. At the same time, his meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was critical for peace and strategic partnership in the South Caucasus. More importantly, Erdoğan also met with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan following these contacts. This meeting, which followed the talks with Aliyev, was a strong indication of Ankara’s quest to manage the balance of power in the South Caucasus and steer the peace process. The talks between Türkiye and Iran were significant in light of the critical period Iran is currently undergoing.
Türkiye’s third way also fills a normative void. While references to Gaza were weak and sporadic in Tianjin, Erdoğan was the only leader to bring the issue to the agenda genuinely. This shows that Türkiye has made its third way strategy even more meaningful by also raising universal issues. At a time when the West supports Israel and major powers such as China, India and Russia prefer silence, Türkiye is stating that the genocide in Gaza is rendering international institutions even more dysfunctional.
The Tianjin summit highlighted the SCO’s limitations, as well as its strategic significance in global politics. The appeal of multipolarity is strong, but a substantive normative framework is still lacking.
In this environment, Türkiye is trying to maintain its strategic architecture with the West while developing balanced relations with actors in Asia. For Ankara, the issue is not the search for a new bloc, but the ability to manage multipolarity through a policy of balance.
