Sending “STUFF” (Let’s Stay Real)


With activity somewhat less than spellbinding on the ground in Ukraine, apparently, a current pass time amongst some DKos diarists is to write about what “stuff” Ukraine needs to win the war. These specify sending a bunch of “stuff” that, in many cases, is science fiction; is (maybe) in development and might be ready in a few years; does not exist at all; exists only in relatively useless small quantities; would require extensive modification before delivery, …

Okay, I’ll admit that this is not a current activity for many writers here, but we’ve all seen it of late on the #Ukraine tag. I figured that, since I (and others) have been accused of not wanting Ukraine to win simply because I do not adhere to these fantastical, almost random views of how a war should be supplied, I would put forth my own thoughts on the “stuff” that Ukraine needs.

first, There is no magic pill

I believe that no amount of super “stuff” will “win” this war within the foreseeable future barring a major event that is likely outside of Ukraine’s borders and control with “win” defined as militarily pushing Russia back to its pre-1994 borders.

Taking the existing situation and superimposing a ton of “stuff” will not lead to a huge change in result. Would it stop and, in some cases, reverse Russian advances? Yes, I believe it would. However, with Avdiivka now gone, there’s not much in the way of Russian advances going on anyway when compared to the vast amount of acreage that remains free. For detail on that, see here. Would it increase Russia’s losses in material and manpower while reducing the same for Ukraine? Yes, I believe it would. These alone are excellent reasons to send “stuff,” so, we really need to start sending it, again. Quick-like.

However, would it cause Russia to turn tail and run for the border or lead to deep penetrations of Russian defensive positions or cause the crippling of Russia’s industrial base? NO. I do not believe it would. You may have a different opinion. More power to you. This is not intended to debate the point. It is to talk about what we should send.

So, with that out of the way, what “stuff” should we send? Should we be sending blimps and not-yet-highly-modified F-16s and purely theoretical naval drones and a bunch of “stuff” that is at the fever-dream stage of development? No. We can’t sent it if it doesn’t exist or will delay things a great deal. And we should not be distracted by this BS dream “stuff”. Let’s keep it real.

No amount of Wiki searching will win the war for Ukraine.

the Reality is Boring, not High-Speed Super-Duper New Shit

We should concentrate our efforts on and contact our lawmakers about

REAL “STUFF!”

While people win wars, they do need “stuff” and what the US specifically (other countries need to send stuff”, too) should send, in my opinion, is the boring things that actually help people win wars. It falls roughly into these categories:

  • Replacements
  • Ammunition
  • Supply of Regular Ongoing Needs
  • Reinforcement of Strengths, Based Upon Future Plans
  • Addressing Weaknesses, Based Upon Future Plans
  • Expansion of Existing Capacities and Preparing New Capabilities, Based on Future Plans

Replacements as requested by Ukraine:

Ukraine has suffered losses through combat and breakage/wear. First, replace combat and non-combat vehicles and equipment to bring Ukraine back up to the levels supplied previously if requested by Ukraine. Quantities are approximate and are not the amount to send. They are the amount to build back to for this stage of supply. Also, they should be brought to full strength not counting those being repaired in Poland (e.g. Bradleys), the US (e.g. HIMARs), and other locations. Those in repair are now extra and can go back to Ukraine when fixed to replace future losses which will occur:

  • M2A2 Bradley IFVs – 200. It wouldn’t surprise me to find out that Ukraine is down 40-50 of these including those in Poland for repair.
  • Other armored Infantry vehicles (M113s, M1117s, Strykers, armored ambulances, etc.) – 1,000.
  • MRAPs (various designs) – 1,000.
  • M109A6 Paladin 155mm SP guns – 18; plus ammunition support vehicles for these – 30.
  • Cargo/fuel/water trucks and trailers, medical treatment vehicles – 400.
  • Mortars and towed guns (105mm and 155mm (M777s)) plus their tactical tow vehicles as needed. They might not really want these, though. Towed howitzers are fast becoming a thing of the past for everything units that move by helicopter.
  • Humvees and Light Tactical Vehicles – Bunches.
  • Patriot launchers and any other lost air defense equipment.
  • Radar of every type. Replace those lost.
  • Recovery vehicles (including M88s).
  • Small arms (MGs, etc.), radios, night vision devices, etc. as requested.

This alone will amount to several hundred vehicles and major pieces of equipment plus many semi-trailers of smaller “stuff.” You may have noticed that Abrams tanks aren’t listed. I’ll leave you to ponder that. It’s at the end.


Ammunition as requested by Ukraine:

Inventories of all types of ammunition have been, at best, reduced and, at worst, almost run dry. Bring it back up to required levels and beyond:

  • Boring Big Bore Rounds: 105mm and 155mm shells for howitzers plus tank and mortar ammo to match their tube/needs. CM and regular.
  • Specialty Rounds: precision 155mm rounds, 155mm Remote Mine (RAAM) rounds, base bleed rounds, RAP rounds, etc.
  • Small Arms Ammo: 25mm rounds for the Bradleys by the ton plus other small arms ammo for everyone. Boat-loads.
  • Small Missiles: Stinger, Javelins, TOWs, and other anti-armor/anti-air missiles.
  • Explosives/Mines: Claymore mines and any other mines they ask for. Add in C4 explosives and required explosive gear (caps, det cord, fuse cord, obstacle clearing charges, etc.).
  • Bigger Ground-Launched Missiles/Rockets: HIMARs and GLSDB rockets plus ATACMS (a couple dozen 300 km and all the shorter range cluster ones you can).
  • Missiles and Rockets and Bombs (Oh, my!!): Harpoons, HARMs, APKWS, RIM-7s, Zunis, Hydra 70s, AIM-7 and 9s, J-DAMs … Build their inventory back up as requested.
  • National Level Air Defense: Patriot, NASAMs, and other air defense missiles (Many have been used). Plus extras.

Time to restock.


Supply Regular Ongoing Needs as requested by Ukraine:  

Tools, field equipment, parts, batteries, spares, tires, track shoes, spare barrels, repair and diagnostic equipment, maintenance manuals TRANSLATED INTO UKRAINIAN, body armor, helmets, winter gear, boots, uniforms, gas masks, barbed wire and concertina, chain saws, picks and shovels, medical supplies, field rations, medicines, water purification equipment, EOD gear, generators, night vision devices/sights, laser range finders, surveillance systems, and other optics, tactical communications equipment, personal hygiene supplies, mobile kitchens and showers, etc. ALL THE BORING “STUFF” THAT MAKES AN ARMY ACTUALLY WORK!!!


Reinforce Strengths if requested by Ukraine:

  • Send another 100 Bradleys on top of the 200 from before. More, if possible. Also, send the command, staff, and support equipment needed to go with this new brigade’s-worth of Bradleys. This alsp means upping the supply of 25mm ammo and TOW missiles.
  • Ask Ukraine what other “stuff” worked that they want more of.

Address Weaknesses as requested by Ukraine:

  • Send more Paladin howitzers: Quadruple the number of M109A6s (54 more) and ammunition support vehicles (90 more) after training the crews, battery personnel, commanders, and maintenance people.
  • Send more FIST Fire Support vehicles beyond the four (ONLY FOUR???) sent. Send a dozen or more after training the crews and commanders. If there aren’t enough of the Bradley-based version, send the M113-based version.
  • Send at least 200-300 more cargo/fuel/water trucks and trailers and medical treatment vehicles. 
  • Send more recovery/maintenance vehicles including M1089A1P2 WreckersM984A4 HEMTT Wreckers, and M88s Heavy Recovery Vehicles.
  • Send every piece of EW equipment we can lay our hands on. I haven’t the expertise to say what. Just send it.
  • Send camo net systems. Hundreds Thousands of them.

Special Weaknesses 1 – Engineering (i.e. Minefields): What stopped Ukraine last campaign season? MINEFIELDS. No point in sending lots of offensive capability if it will sit on the wrong side of the minefields. If there is any area/subject that needs “fairyland” thinking of the sort we have seen here recently, it is this area right here right now. And I have no magic to add, unfortunately, other than send more of what we have now. Just greater capacity using the current technology. Blimps won’t help. Super-modified F-16s delivered in 2-3 years won’t help. SEND EVERY MINE CLEARING CAPABILITY WE HAVE!

Since it fits into the Engineering category, other engineering equipment is listed here as well:

  • More M1074 Joint Assault Bridge Systems (AVLB) and other bridging equipment. There aren’t many M1074s around, so maybe there are some old M60-based AVLBs out there. Doubtful, though, since they sucked 40 years ago.
  • Earth moving equipment of every sort from simple back hoes to specialized trenching machines (if they now exist in US inventory).

Special Weaknesses 2 – Air Defense:

  • Lots more air defense to replace all losses plus send more. This is a big cost item, so we must keep in might the resource constraints that exist. We may WANT to send ten more Patriot batteries, but what other items will we NOT be able to send if we burn through the available resources with just one item. IT’S A BALANCING ACT.
  • Send 18 more (at least) Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) gun trucks, assuming the ones they received already worked for them and assuming they exist or can be made fairly quickly. They’re new, so… But they seem like a good concept.

Expansion of Capacity and Capability as requested by Ukraine:

More 3D printers; satellite imagery, data, and targeting information; satellite communications antennae; SATCOM terminals and services; technical assistance at every level of every specialty.

F-16: Advance the goal of F-16 use by the Ukrainian air force. I worded that carefully since I do not expect to see F-16s in the skies over Ukraine in any useful quantity this year. So, build for next year. I was not air force (thank dog), so I’m sure there are many steps that could be taken to advance the integration of F-16s into the Ukrainian military. These are just some examples:

  • Training for maintenance personnel, ground crews, command and staff, airfield personnel, section leaders and NCOs, parts specialists, etc.
  • Build the support structures these aircraft will require. Form entire units of support personnel and send them to NATO bases that support the aircraft to work alongside NATO personnel.
  • Start building the tool kits these maintenance personnel will need.
  • Give them old aircraft, engines, other sub-systems, e.g. landing gear, avionics, etc. upon which to train. Send old wings with hard points so ground crews can practice loading ordnance.
  • Hire contractors that will work alongside the Ukrainian support people within the units.
  • Translate manuals and technical information into Ukrainian. Change aircraft data plates as well.
  • Build the parts inventory these planes will need at all levels.
  • Train radar operators to “Identify Friend or Foe” (IFF) on these new, unfamiliar aircraft.
  • Start to stockpile ordnance the F-16 can carry that Ukraine will find useful.
  • Modify airfields, if required.

This much replacement and new equipment will require an additional 10K troops and probably more to rebuild the units that are now undermanned and to form probably one new brigade (if the extra 100 Bradleys come through) and to support the fighting units. Ukraine must plan where this additional manpower will come from. Reports are that they are stretched thin as it is.

In other words, it’s probably time, in my opinion, for Ukraine to expand conscription. Actually, it’s about nine months past time since training takes many months. This means any likely large push is now into next year.

And Europe needs to supply more Leopard 2s to accompany the extra Bradleys and/or replace losses. Probably about 100 (off the top of my head).

Both of these last two items are problems.


This list above is many boatloads and several billions of dollars, so no one is dragging any feet. Throw in the millions of man-hours of training that must be done including training up and developing commanders and staff and NCOs and, most important, entire units, and we’re at another boatload of supplies used during that training time. Training ain’t free. That means that there will need to be difficult decisions made at each step based on available money and estimated future need. Unlike some folks, we here know that the money/resources are not infinite and that we do not live in a constraint free environment. As I do not have access to costs and quantities of each item etc., I cannot specify more exactly what should be sent. But it’s a balance. And we here are BS guessing and arguing over BS details about which we know very little.

So, 2025 is the likely planning horizon.

Hope to see everyone still here and interested/involved then. In the meantime, write your congress-critters and talk about…

REAL “STUFF!”

I bet the fastest way to get your missive thrown in the Congressional trash bin by some aide is to put in the word “dirigible.”



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