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Recently, the United States announced the decision to withdraw approximately 1,000 troops from Romania. According to a press release from the U.S. Army’s European and African Command, the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Airborne Division, which was deployed to Eastern Europe in 2022 in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, will now redeploy to its home base without replacement. While this rotational force had elements in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, Romania is the main victim of this withdrawal, given that the vast majority of the brigade’s personnel were based at the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base near the Black Sea port of Constanța.
This ill-timed decision, announced to Romania, one of the most pro-American states on NATO’s eastern flank, drew criticism from both Republican and Democratic members of Congress. Although the U.S. government is still in shutdown, the two heads of the House and Senate Armed Services committees, Republicans Mike Rogers and Roger Wicker, issued a joint statement calling for a review of the decision.
According to Rogers and Wicker’s statement, “this decision also sends the wrong signal to Russia at the very moment President Trump is applying pressure to force Vladimir Putin to come to the table to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.” Romanian Foreign Minister Oana Toiu announced, in response, that Bucharest authorities are expecting that more NATO forces from the European allies will step up to ensure that a gap in deterrence will not invite more aggression in the Black Sea region. It is unclear, however, where these troops will come from: the French Minister of Defense stated last week that, although France is leading the NATO multinational battlegroup in Romania, they are not planning to send additional troops on top of what they have already deployed at Cincu.
As countries from Western Europe are struggling with their own domestic agendas, bypassing the “guns versus butter” debates while trying to fulfill their 5% of GDP for defense spending pledge made at the latest NATO summit in the Hague, the NATO Black Sea allies are thus forced to learn the strategic grammar of self-sufficiency, rather than waiting for someone else to save them. Since February 2022, the Black Sea has become a theater of war as a result of Russia’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine, and the implications of this militarization are global, as this waterway is a key link in global supply chains, assuring worldwide food security. Given the U.S.’ retrenchment from the region, NATO allies should find alternative ways to cooperate and project power towards the Kremlin. They cannot do so without meaningful engagement with NATO’s largest military power in the region – Türkiye.
What Türkiye can do
One tool that can be used to signal the formation of a regional, self-sufficient security community in the Black Sea region that could survive the American withdrawal is the establishment of a EU-Türkiye security and defense partnership, just like the ones Brussels has already established with states like the U.K., Canada, Australia and Korea. These political instruments are key to bolstering joint efforts in areas as diverse as crisis management, cyber issues, maritime security, counterterrorism and critical infrastructure protection. They also serve as avenues for facilitating partners’ participation in the EU’s missions and operations organized under the Common Security and Defense Policy.
As the EU committed to a strategic approach toward the Black Sea, including the establishment of a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub with the role to enhance information sharing and situational awareness in the region, inking a security and defense partnership with Ankara could not be more timely. The inclusion of Türkiye in the EU’s Black Sea security strategy is all the more necessary to counterbalance the growing aggression of the Russian Federation, but also to signal an alignment of EU and NATO policies in this key region.
Türkiye has to pursue a delicate balancing act by not alienating Russia while actively cooperating with its neighbors to avoid Russia’s consolidation of power in the Black Sea. Ankara possesses deep naval assets and large coast-guard and maritime surveillance capabilities. Maritime security could be a shared domain of interest to be included in a security and defense partnership between Brussels and Ankara. Additionally, Türkiye’s growing defense-industrial base provides a great advantage for improved situational awareness in the region.
As the biggest NATO navy in the Black Sea, Türkiye proves to be a crucial asset for the alliance and for further cooperation with the EU to signal self-sufficiency. Türkiye has been exceeding the 2% of the gross domestic product (GDP) spending target for NATO, and supports the new increased target of 5%. With the 2026 NATO Summit being held in Ankara in July, the EU, NATO and Türkiye have an important opportunity to agree on new mechanisms to boost cooperation and bolster operational logistics, as well as to reinforce deterrence. Including Türkiye in the EU’s defense initiatives in the Black Sea would fortify collective deterrence and defense, while signaling to Moscow the existence of a strong, regionally rooted security community. Such enhanced cooperation would not only benefit the EU’s quest for a stronger hand against Russia, but it would also fulfill Türkiye’s goals to be a regional power.
Despite the incentives for an extended security community, cooperation is impeded by political factors, more so than technicalities. Greece is strongly opposing Türkiye’s participation in EU SAFE, a $150 billion project to speed up the member states’ defense readiness while including certain allies for common procurement, including Albania, Canada, Japan and the U.K. Greece acknowledges the gap in Europe’s defense, and Türkiye’s NATO-trained military and integrated defense industry could significantly enhance the operational readiness of Europe.
Drone and anti-drone systems procurement under SAFE will consist of NATO Class 1, small drones, and Classes 2 and 3, drones other than small drones and their anti-drone systems. Given Türkiye’s assistance to Ukraine with Bayraktar drones and its growing role as a manufacturer, the country’s inclusion in SAFE and the Drone Wall project is essential for EU member states. Türkiye’s global leadership of the drone industry is already integrated with Europe, as 55.4% of the country’s defense and aerospace exports were to European countries. Therefore, political vetoes to exclude a global drone power from the project risk fragmenting capability development and leaving gaps in a contiguous Black Sea-to-Aegean security architecture.
The support of other EU member states is crucial to overcoming bottlenecks. Germany has expressed staunch support for deepened and strengthened EU-Türkiye strategic partnerships. Romania’s activism in the Black Sea is also crucial to keep Türkiye engaged. Romania’s purchase of a warship from Türkiye and willingness to extend the Mining Countermeasures Task Force with Türkiye and Bulgaria will amplify NATO’s presence in the eastern and southern flanks and provide a stronger base for increased EU-Türkiye defense cooperation in the era of U.S. withdrawal from the region.
As the U.S. rolls back its presence in the Black Sea, the burden to provide security and stability in the region falls increasingly on the EU and Türkiye as key partners and allies. A forward-looking EU-Türkiye security and defense partnership would not only fill the emerging vacuum but also advance NATO’s strategic interests amid growing uncertainty. Türkiye’s naval capabilities and Romania’s activism and growing commitment in the Black Sea provide a strong foundation for a more resilient security architecture that reflects NATO cohesion. Including Türkiye in SAFE and furthering the EU-Türkiye partnership in the Black Sea is not an option, but a necessity for a stronger eastern and southern flank. Such a partnership would signal to Moscow that the Black Sea is not a neglected flank, but a consolidated front.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance, values or position of Daily Sabah. The newspaper provides space for diverse perspectives as part of its commitment to open and informed public discussion.
